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COMMENT 
CFTC V. GIBRALTAR MONETARY CORP. AND 
VICARIOUS LIABILITY UNDER THE 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 
Jason E. Friedman* 
 
This Comment analyzes CFTC v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp., a 2009 
decision in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
introduced a control requirement into the Commodity Exchange Act’s 
vicarious liability provision.  In so doing, the court rejected the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s long-held totality of the 
circumstances approach, in which any one factor, including control, is not 
dispositive of an agency relationship.  This decision has created an 
undesirable situation in which retail foreign exchange dealers and futures 
commission merchants need not investigate the character of their 
introducing entities before retaining them, allowing them to easily avoid 
liability for frauds committed in furtherance of mutual profit. 
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The ascription of agency [under the Commodity Exchange Act] is a 
purposive, policy-oriented act rather than an exercise in semantics.  The 
Commission has deemed [the introducing entity] an agent of [the futures 
commission merchant] in soliciting investors through fraudulent 
means . . . because [the vicarious liability provision’s] words allow this 
interpretation and the interpretation may reduce the amount of fraud in the 
sale of commodity future contracts, whether directly or through 
commodity pools.  Commodities brokers will be more careful about 
whom they grasp to their bosoms as branch managers and commodity 
solicitors and this will be (or so the Commission is authorized to 
conclude) all to the good. 
- Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Rosenthal & 
Co. v. CFTC.1 
One summer day in 2002, the Gibraltar Monetary Corporation mailed a 
package of informational materials to Brook McDonald after she responded 
to their Internet advertisement on foreign exchange (forex) trading.2  The 
package contained a letter touting the “potential for a 200%–300% return” 
and the limited risk involved in options trading.3  It also boasted of 
Gibraltar’s relationship with Forex Capital Markets (FxCM), a futures 
commission merchant registered with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
 
 1. 802 F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 2. CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *14–15 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 3. Id. at *15. 
2010] CFTC V. GIBRALTAR MONETARY CORP. 739 
Commission (CFTC or Commission), which highlighted the fact that all of 
Gibraltar’s clients send their documents and funds directly to FxCM and 
that all options purchased through Gibraltar are cleared through the firm.4 
Shortly after these promotional materials arrived, McDonald received a 
call from a Gibraltar sales representative who baited her with promises of 
quick profits.5  She decided to open an account with the firm, mailed the 
required documentation to FxCM, and granted Gibraltar power of attorney 
to make forex trading decisions on her behalf.6  The sales representative 
transferred McDonald’s account to Edward Johnson, a senior account 
executive, who gained her trust by telling her, untruthfully, that his clients 
had never lost money.7  After her initial investment, Johnson called 
McDonald repeatedly, pressing her to complete additional options trades.8  
Shockingly, when Mrs. McDonald lost “nearly all of the money she 
invested” with Gibraltar, Johnson urged her to sell her car.9 
Gibraltar’s representatives, however, omitted the unpleasant facts that 
forex options could expire worthless, that nearly all of Gibraltar’s 
customers were losing money, and that several Gibraltar employees had 
formerly worked for firms which were penalized for sales fraud.10  During 
the CFTC’s investigation of Gibraltar and FxCM, the Commission asked 
Mrs. McDonald to detail her trading experiences with the two firms.11  She 
lambasted Gibraltar, but did not “express any dissatisfaction with FxCM in 
regards to her trading” or “confusion between the roles played in her trades 
by FxCM and Gibraltar.”12 
In CFTC v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp.,13 the court found Gibraltar and its 
principals liable for their role in the solicitation fraud perpetrated against 
Mrs. McDonald and many others.14  Both the district court and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, however, determined that the 
 
 4. Id. at *14–15. 
 5. Id. at *15.  Specifically, the Gibraltar sales representative, Al Gropman, informed 
McDonald “that she could double her money by investing with Gibraltar if she invested 
quickly to take advantage of the rise in the Euro that resulted from the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.” Id. 
 6. Id. at *17. 
 7. Id. at *15–16.  Johnson “repeatedly pressured McDonald to invest more money.  He 
regularly indicated that he had background in trading [foreign exchange (forex)] options, and 
because of McDonald’s inexperience with such trading that he needed to “drive the train.”  
Despite his aggressiveness—which included calling up to three times in a single day—
McDonald trusted Johnson, because of his representations that as a senior [account 
executive], with years of trading experience, none of his clients ever lost money.” Id. 
 8. Id. at *16.  Because Gibraltar’s profits were driven by commissions Forex Capital 
Markets (FxCM) paid Gibraltar for each options trade Gibraltar’s clients placed with FxCM; 
it did not matter to the firm whether its discretionary trades were profitable—only that they 
were executed. See id. at *8. 
 9. Id. at *16. 
 10. Id. at *16–17; see Charles Lunan, Broker Accused of Fraud:  97% of Investors 
Ended Up as Losers, SUN-SENTINEL, May 6, 1992, at A1. 
 11. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *17–18. 
 12. Id. at *18. 
 13. No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129 (S.D. Fla. 
May 30, 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 14. See id. at *42-60, *73. 
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Commodity Exchange Act’s (CEA or the Act) vicarious liability provision 
did not permit the imposition of Gibraltar’s frauds to FxCM because the 
CFTC failed to demonstrate that FxCM exerted sufficient control over the 
firm.15  The Eleventh Circuit in Gibraltar became the first circuit court of 
appeals to adopt such a restrictive construction of the provision, concluding 
that the CEA requires an element of control to establish an agency 
relationship.16  In so doing, the court declined to defer to the Commission’s 
long-held liberal interpretation of the statute17—one to which the Seventh 
Circuit paid deference and credited with reducing the amount of 
commodities fraud by compelling futures commission merchants to “be 
more careful about whom they grasp to their bosoms.”18 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of commodities regulation, 
the CEA’s vicarious liability provision, and judicial review under the 
framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.19  Part II analyzes in detail the Eleventh Circuit’s Gibraltar 
decision, and the proceedings leading up to that decision.  Part III advocates 
that case law and Chevron doctrine support the Commission’s interpretation 
of the provision and contends that good policy dictates broad application of 
vicarious liability for commodities fraud. 
I.  CLIMBING UP GIBRALTAR:  COMMODITIES REGULATION, THE 
COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT’S VICARIOUS LIABILITY PROVISION, AND 
CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
To better understand the fraud Gibraltar perpetrated against Mrs. 
McDonald, the role of FxCM in facilitating that fraud, and the law 
underlying each party’s arguments in the Gibraltar case, Part I provides a 
wealth of background information.  Part I.A provides an overview of the 
CFTC’s regulation of the commodity futures and options markets, Part I.B 
provides an overview of secondary liability under the CEA, and Part I.C 
explores judicial review of the CFTC’s interpretation of the CEA under 
Chevron doctrine.  Information specific to transactions in foreign exchange, 
which were at issue in the Gibraltar case, is also included throughout this 
part. 
A.  Overview of the Commodity Futures and Options Markets 
Often overshadowed by the larger and better-funded20 Securities and 
Exchange Commission on which it was modeled, the CFTC plays a crucial 
 
 15. CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180, 1186–90 (11th Cir. 2009); Gib. 
Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *60–72. 
 16. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d at 1189. 
 17. See id. at 1188. 
 18. Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[s]ome 
deference must be paid to the special knowledge which the Commission brings to the 
regulation of the commodities markets”). 
 19. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 20. In fiscal year 2007, the SEC’s operating budget was $876 million.  By contrast, the 
CFTC’s stood at just $98 million. Hearing before the S. Appropriations Subcomm. on Fin. 
2010] CFTC V. GIBRALTAR MONETARY CORP. 741 
role in fighting fraud, abuse, and manipulation in the U.S. financial 
markets.21  Established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act of 1974 (CFTCA)22 to replace the outmoded Commodity Exchange 
Commission,23 Congress granted to the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over 
the commodity futures and options markets and empowered the new agency 
to initiate administrative disciplinary proceedings and seek injunctions in 
federal district court to enforce the CEA.24 
Since the CFTC’s inception in 1974, the trading volume on U.S. futures 
exchanges has increased by a staggering 8000% to approximately five 
trillion dollars each day.25  Financial engineers have developed derivative 
instruments of increasing size and complexity, and these contracts are 
traded electronically around the globe twenty-four hours a day.26  As the 
futures and options markets have grown, so too has commodities fraud. 27  
Poor Mrs. McDonald, who was fleeced out of thousands in Gibraltar’s forex 
options trading scam, is certainly not alone.28 
The sections below provide a basic overview of the commodities markets 
by introducing commodities, commodities futures and options, the CEA’s 
various classes of registrants, and CFTC enforcement actions and 
reparations proceedings. 
 
Servs. and Gen. Gov’t and the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 111th Cong. 7 
(2008) (Testimony of Walter Lukken, Acting Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter Lukken 
Testimony]. 
 21. Michael S. Sackheim, Administrative Enforcement of the Federal Commodities Laws 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 445, 445–46 
(1982) (stating that Congress modeled the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC or Commission) in the image of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and 
created the agency to shield investors in the commodities markets from “abusive and 
criminal practices”). 
 22. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (CFTCA), Pub L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 23. Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 (CFTCA) to revamp 
the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) and to strengthen its regulation of the commodities 
markets as a result of market abuse and fluctuating commodity prices during the 1970s. See 
S. REP. NO. 93-1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5858–59; Jerry W. 
Markham, The Seventh Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 
87, 92–94 (1982). 
 24. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . 
with respect to . . . [commodity] ‘option[s]’ . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale 
of a commodity for future delivery . . . .”); id. § 9 (empowering the CFTC to initiate 
administrative disciplinary hearings); id. § 13a-1 (empowering the CFTC to initiate 
injunctions in federal court); see Markham, supra note 23 at 92–94; Sackheim, supra note 
2121, at 445–46. 
 25. Lukken Testimony, supra note 20, at 1, 6.  During that time, the CFTC’s staffing 
levels have actually fallen by twelve percent. Id. at 6. 
 26. Id. at 1. 
 27. Financial Crimes Report to the Public:  Fiscal Year 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-
services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (reporting that 
instances of commodities fraud and the investor losses associated with them have been 
increasing).  
 28. See supra Introduction. 
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1.  Commodities:  More Than Just the Bacon in Your BLT 
 What are commodities?  Commodities are agricultural products like 
coffee that you had for breakfast; wheat, which is used to make bread; 
pork bellies, which is used to make bacon, which you might find in a 
bacon and lettuce and tomato sandwich; and then there are other 
commodities, like frozen orange juice and gold.  Though, of course, gold 
doesn’t grow on trees like oranges.  That clear so far?29 
- Mortimer Duke 
Though informative, Mortimer Duke’s explanation of commodities 
simplifies the statutory definition.  As originally enacted in 1936, the 
Commodity Exchange Act defined “commodity” as “wheat, cotton, rice, 
corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs and 
Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes).”30  Over the next four decades, this 
definition gradually expanded to embrace wool tops in 1938,31 fats and oils 
(including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other 
fats and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, and soybean 
meal in 1940,32 wool in 1954,33 onions in 1955,34 and livestock, livestock 
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice in 1968.35 
Congress again enlarged the definition of “commodity” as part of its 
major overhaul of the CEA in 1974 to include all “goods and articles, 
except onions . . . and all services, rights, and interests in which contracts 
for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”36  The expansion 
 
 29. TRADING PLACES (Paramount Pictures 1983) (describing the commodities business 
to Eddie Murphy’s character, Billy Ray Valentine). 
 30. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 2(a), 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)). 
 31. See Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-471, 52 Stat. 
205 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)). 
 32. See Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-818, 54 Stat. 
1059 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)). 
 33. See National Wool Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-690, § 710, 68 Stat. 910, 913 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)). 
 34. See Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-174, 69 Stat. 
375 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)).  Trading in onion futures was prohibited in 
1958. See Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-839, 72 Stat. 
1013 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13-1) (“No contract for the sale of onions for future delivery 
shall be made on or subject to the rules of any board of trade in the United States.”).  In 
connection with the exclusion of onions from the CEA’s definition of commodity, one judge 
quipped, “[t]his provision brought tears to the eyes of at least some would-be onion futures 
traders.” Salomon Forex Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768, 772 n.10 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citing 
Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. Tieken, 178 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ill. 1959)). 
 35. See Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–258, § 1, 82 
Stat. 26, 26 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006)) (livestock and livestock 
products); Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-418, 82 Stat. 413 (codified as amended at 7 
U.S.C. § 1a(4) (frozen concentrated orange juice). 
 36. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
§ 201(a)-(b), 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4)).  This broad 
definition of “commodity,” enacted as part of the CFTCA, “expanded the definition of 
commodity to encompass virtually anything that is or becomes the subject of futures trading, 
intangible as well as tangible.”  1 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.02[1], at 1-7 (3d ed. Supp. 2002-2).  The purpose of 
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of the statute to include nonagricultural commodities irked the Treasury 
Department, which urged Congress to exclude off-exchange currency 
transactions from the statute’s grasp.37  The enactment of the Treasury 
Amendment that same year was intended to insulate off-exchange currency 
trading between sophisticated institutional investors,38 but the provision 
ultimately “made it difficult for the CFTC to bring fraud actions against off-
exchange foreign currency scams aimed at retail customers.”39 
Congress modified the Treasury Amendment as part of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), and granted the CFTC limited 
jurisdiction over off-exchange forex futures and options transactions.40  By 
the words of the statute, certain forex transactions, like those between Mrs. 
McDonald and FxCM, were expressly subject only to the CEA’s anti-fraud 
provisions.41  As such, many courts determined that the Act’s vicarious 
liability provision should not apply to such transactions.42  In part to resolve 
this dispute, Congress passed the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(CRA), which amended the CEA to clarify that off-exchange forex 
transactions are indeed subject to the CEA’s vicarious liability provision as 
well.43 
 
enlarging the definition of futures and extending the regulation of the futures markets was 
“to suppress cheating, fraud, and fictitious transactions in futures which were seriously 
impairing the services of the market.” S. REP. NO. 93-1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5855. 
 37. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
§ 201(b), 88 Stat. 1389, 1395 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(1)) (“Nothing in this 
Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign 
currency . . . unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted 
on a board of trade.”); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 468–69, 471 n.8 (1997) (“The 
amendment was enacted on the suggestion of the Treasury Department at the time of a 
dramatic expansion in the scope of federal commodities regulation.  The Department 
expressed concerns . . . that this development might lead, inter alia, to the unintended 
regulation of the off-exchange market in foreign currency futures.”). 
 38. See S. REP. NO. 93-1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5862–63 (“A 
great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried out through an 
informal network of banks and tellers.  The Committee believes that this market is more 
properly supervised by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this 
legislation is unnecessary.”). 
 39. Walter Lukken, Acting CFTC Chairman, Keynote Address at Hofstra University 
FOREX Symposium (Feb. 8, 2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/opalukken-36.pdf. 
 40. Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
§ 102, 114 Stat. 2763A-365, -376, -377. 
 41. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C) (2006); CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-
CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *60–61 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2006), 
aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009).  The exempted transactions included those in which 
eligible contract participants, including financial institutions and future commission 
merchants, acted as counterparties. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12); id. § 2(c)(2)(C); CFTC v. Zelener, 
373 F.3d 861, 862 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 42. See, e.g., CFTC v. Sterling Trading Grp., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1256 (S.D. Fla. 
2009); Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *60–61. 
 43. See CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 (CRA), Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 13,101, 122 
Stat. 1651, 2189–2194 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)); H.R. REP. NO. 110-627, at 979 
(2008) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 536, 801 (stating that the CRA makes 
§ 2(a)(1)(B) explicitly apply “to fraudulent forex activities”). 
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2.  Commodities Derivatives Contracts:  Futures, Forwards, and Options 
The Commodity Exchange Act charges the CFTC with exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain commodities derivatives contracts, including 
futures and options.44  Section 2(a)(1) of the CEA grants the CFTC 
jurisdiction over “transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity 
for future delivery,”45 commonly referred to as futures contracts.46  These 
instruments are simply agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of a 
commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date.47  Like the 
underlying commodities themselves, futures contracts are fungible because 
they are written in standard, uniform terms and each party’s obligations to 
the other are guaranteed by an intermediary.48 
Despite being a contract of sale for future delivery, futures contracts 
rarely result in actual delivery of the commodity because either party may 
extinguish its obligations by taking an offsetting position.49  As Judge 
Posner wryly stated, this process “enables people who are not 
agriculturalists, and wouldn’t know an ear of corn from a soybean if it 
slapped them in the face, to speculate in the prices of commodities.”50 
The CEA excludes from its definition of futures contract “any sale of any 
cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery.”51  These instruments, 
called forwards, are contracts in which a sale occurs, but the parties agree 
 
 44. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A); Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? The 
Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 
3100 (2008) (stating that the CEA “broadly regulates derivative products”). 
 45. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (“The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . with 
respect to . . . transactions involving contracts of sale . . . for future delivery . . . .”). 
 46. Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, § 3, 42 Stat. 998, 999 (1922) (“Transactions 
in grain involving the sale thereof for future delivery as commonly conducted on boards of 
trade [are] known as ‘futures’ . . . .”); see Benjamin E. Kozinn, Note, The Great Copper 
Caper:  Is Market Manipulation Really A Problem in the Wake of the Sumitomo Debacle?, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 249–50 (2000) (explaining that the CEA grants the CFTC with 
exclusive jurisdiction over futures, without ever defining the term “futures contract”). 
 47. See Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining a 
commodity futures contract as “an executory, mutually binding agreement providing for the 
future delivery of a commodity on a date certain where the grade, quantity, and price at the 
time of delivery are fixed”); Chi. Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“A futures contract, roughly speaking, is a fungible promise to buy or sell a particular 
commodity at a fixed date in the future.”); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[3], at 
1-19; Kozinn, supra note 46, at 250. 
 48. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[3], at 1-19; Kozinn, supra note 46, 
at 250. 
 49. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 971; Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 542; 1 
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[4], at 1-21 (stating that nearly ninety-five percent 
of futures contracts are closed out through the offsetting process). 
 50. Nagel v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc. 217 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 51. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19) (2006); see Nagel, 217 F.3d at 440 (“The Act defines a futures 
contract as a contract for future delivery, but defines future delivery to exclude ‘any sale of 
any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery,’ that is, any forward contract.” 
(internal citations omitted)); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[3], at 1-18.1 (Supp. 
2002-2). 
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that actual delivery of the specified commodity will be delayed until some 
later date.52  In contrast with futures contracts, parties to a forward contract 
actually contemplate the physical delivery of the commodity.53  This subtle 
distinction is often the subject of litigation,54 for if a court deems the 
transaction in question a forward and not a future, the instrument would 
generally lie outside the CFTC’s regulatory jurisdiction.55 
In addition to futures, Congress has charged the CFTC with the exclusive 
authority to regulate trading in commodity options56—contracts that confer 
a right, but not an obligation, to either buy or sell an underlying commodity 
(or future) at a fixed price and date.57  To purchase an option, the trader 
pays a premium to the writer, which will expire unless its holder chooses to 
exercise his right to complete the transaction.58  An option holder can 
simply allow the option to lapse if it is unprofitable,59 thus limiting her loss 
to the premium paid to the writer of the option.60  Commodity options 
further differ from commodity futures in that commodity options trading is 
not limited to organized exchanges.61  This fact enabled Gibraltar to route 
Mrs. McDonald’s forex options trades through FxCM’s off-exchange forex 
trading platform. 
3.  Categories of CFTC Registrants 
In addition to defining “commodities” and “futures,” the CEA introduces 
a hodgepodge of statutory classifications of individuals or entities required 
 
 52. See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19); Nagel, 217 F.3d at 440; 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, 
§ 1.02[3], at 1-18.1 (Supp. 2002-2). 
 53. See Lachmund v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 777, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“[C]ash forward contracts . . . contemplate or result in the physical transfer of the 
underlying commodity.”). 
 54. See, e.g., CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309 (6th Cir. 2008) (rollovers of currency 
sales); CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2004) (rollovers of currency sales); Nagel, 
217 F.3d at 440 (rollovers of grain sales); Lachmund, 191 F.3d at 786 (same). 
 55. Erskine, 512 F.3d at 325; Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 138 F. 
Supp. 2d 1144, 1156 (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
 56. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2006) (granting “[t]he Commission . . . exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . with respect to . . . [commodity] ‘option[s]’”); Markham, supra note 23, at 
87 (stating that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all commodity options 
transactions).  As originally enacted in 1936, however, the Commodity Exchange Act 
prohibited options trading on all regulated commodities. See Commodity Exchange Act, 
Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 4c, 49 Stat. 1491, 1494 (1936); 13A JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
COMMODITIES REGULATION:  FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS § 27:2, at 27-18 
(2010).  The Act’s limited prohibition, however, created a regulatory loophole, in which 
trading in unregulated commodities options, such as gold, silver, coffee, and sugar, was able 
to thrive. See id.  In 1982, Congress lifted the ban and authorized commodity options trading 
on the organized exchanges under a limited pilot program. See id.  Today, exchange-based 
options trading is widespread. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 206, 
96 Stat. 2294, 2301; 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[9], at 1-62.8 (Supp. 2003). 
 57. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[9], at 1-62.6 (Supp. 2003); Carolyn H. 
Jackson, Note, Have You Hedged Today?:  The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3205, 3212 (1999). 
 58. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[9], at 1-62.6 (Supp. 2003). 
 59. Id. at 1-62.8 (Supp. 2003). 
 60. Id.; Jackson, supra note 57, at 3212. 
 61. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.02[9], at 1-62.8 (Supp. 2003). 
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to register with the CFTC and comply with its rules and regulations.62  
Among the first of the CEA’s required registrants was the futures 
commission merchant, which was added to the statutory scheme in 1936.63  
A futures commission merchant is the commodities equivalent of a 
brokerage house64—it is an individual or entity that solicits or accepts 
orders from clients to buy or sell commodity futures or options and accepts 
payment in connection with those orders.65  Although the largest futures 
commission merchants are affiliates of multinational banks and insurance 
companies, other futures commission merchants, such as FxCM, are 
standalone entities dealing exclusively with retail customers.66 
The CFTCA introduced registration and reporting requirements for 
several classes of commodities professionals:  associated persons, 
commodity pool operators, and commodity trading advisors.67  A 
commodity pool operator is an individual or entity that operates or solicits 
funds for a commodity pool—an enterprise that, like a mutual fund, 
combines investor funds for the purpose of trading commodity futures or 
options contracts.68  A commodity trading advisor is an individual or entity 
engaged in the business of giving advice or issuing reports or analyses with 
respect to trading in commodity futures or options.69  An associated person 
is anyone other than an introducing broker engaged in soliciting and 
 
 62. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 1a (2006). 
 63. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 4(d), 49 Stat. 1491, 1494 
(1936) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage as [a] futures commission 
merchant . . . unless . . . such person shall have registered [and complied with the Act’s 
regulations].”); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.06[1], at 1-137 (Supp. 2001) 
(stating that futures commission merchants “first came under regulation when the 
Commodity Exchange Act was amended in 1936”).  Such regulations include segregation of 
customer accounts, mandatory disclosures, and minimum net capital requirements. See 7 
U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6f, 6g. 
 64. 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.06[1], at 1-137 (Supp. 2001) (explaining 
that a futures commission merchant “if in the securities business, would probably be called a 
brokerage house”).  An individual investor wishing to trade on the commodities markets 
opens an account with a futures commission merchant, which receives trading orders directly 
from its customers or through an intermediary such as an introducing broker. Id. 
 65. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(20) (2006). 
 66. See 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.06[3], at 1-142 (Supp. 2001).  With 
roughly $13 billion each in adjusted net capital, UBS and Goldman Sachs operate the largest 
futures commission merchants.  By contrast, FxCM has just $58 million. See CFTC, 
SELECTED FCM FINANCIAL DATA AS OF OCTOBER 31, 2009, http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@financialdataforfcms/documents/file/fcmdata1009.pdf. 
 67. See Pub L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1396–97; S. REP. NO. 93-1131 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5871-75; 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, 
§ 1.08[2], at 1-157 (Supp. 2003) (associated persons); id. § 1.10[1], at 1-175 (commodity 
trading advisors); id. § 1.11[1], at 1-184 (commodity pool operators). 
 68. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(5); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.11[2], at 1-185 (Supp. 
2002-2); 13 MARKHAM, supra note 56, § 17A:1, at 17A-1.  Commodity pools are attractive 
to investors because they offer:  (1) easy entry to the complex commodity markets; (2) 
limited liability; (3) diversification; (4) lack of margin calls; and (5) no responsibility to 
make or take delivery on futures contracts. Id. at 17A-1 to -2.  As of 2005, there were 
roughly 3500 commodity pools with about $600 billion in assets under management. Id. at 
17A-2. 
 69. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(6); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.10[2], at 1-175 to -178 
(Supp. 2003). 
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accepting orders or supervising those activities on behalf of another entity 
regulated by the CFTC.70 
Until the CEA was again amended in 1982, futures commission 
merchants solicited business from the public primarily through their 
associated persons and loosely affiliated “agents.”71  These “agents” were 
mostly unregistered and unregulated and the futures commission merchants 
for which they solicited clientele would generally disclaim all responsibility 
for their violations of the commodities laws.72  In response, Congress 
created a new class of registrants, known as introducing brokers, as part of 
the Futures Trading Act of 1982.73  An introducing broker is an individual 
or entity that solicits or accepts orders to buy or sell commodity futures or 
options but does not accept money or other assets as payment for the 
order.74  Generally, those who solicit “customers for futures commission 
merchants must register with the CFTC as introducing brokers and either 
meet capital requirements or obtain a guarantee of their obligations from 
their futures commission merchant.”75  These restrictions did not apply, 
however, in the off-exchange market; a loophole that allowed the Gibraltar 
firm to solicit customers for FxCM without registering with the 
Commission.76 
 
 70. 7 U.S.C. § 6k (declaring it “unlawful for any person to be associated with a futures 
commission merchant,” introducing broker, commodity pool operator, or commodity trading 
advisor in a sales capacity if such person is not registered with the CFTC as an associated 
person). 
 71. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 49 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 
3898 (“Although agents may perform the same functions as branch officers of futures 
commission merchants, agents generally are separately owned and run.”); 1 JOHNSON & 
HAZEN, supra note 36, § 1.08[2], at 1-157 (Supp. 2003). 
 72. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 49 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 
3898 (“Futures commission merchants frequently disavow any responsibility for sales abuses 
or other violations committed by these agents.”); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, 
§ 1.08[2], at 1-157 (Supp. 2003). 
 73. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 49 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 
3898 (“Under [The Act], persons now considered agents would be required to register 
directly with the Commission as introducing brokers . . . .”); 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra 
note 36, § 1.08[2], at 1-157 (Supp. 2003).  Although the CFTC had lobbied Congress to 
require all of these former “agents” to register as associated persons, Congress instead 
decided to create the introducing broker. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 49 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3898.  Congress chose this structure in part to shield 
futures commission merchants from liability, but expressed that a futures commission 
merchant could be held liable as principal when its introducing broker acts as a de facto 
branch office of the futures commission merchant or when the introducing broker is not truly 
acting an independent business entity. See id. at 3982. 
 74. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(23) (2006). 
 75. Brief of Appellant CFTC at 34–35, CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180 
(11th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-14270-C); see 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1) (establishing requirements for 
introducing brokers); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.17(a)(1)(iii), (2)(ii) (2010) (same). 
 76. 7 U.S.C. § 6d(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.17(a)(1)(iii), (2)(ii) (2010)).  In a 2002 advisory 
release, the CFTC also explained that although most soliciting brokers must register with the 
CFTC as an associated person of the futures commission merchant or an introducing broker, 
“entities that introduce retail customers solely to trade off-exchange foreign currency futures 
and options with registered futures commission merchants that act solely as counterparties, 
are not required to register under the Act as introducing brokers, but may do so voluntarily.” 
Division of Trading & Markets, CFTC, Advisory Concerning Foreign Currency Trading by 
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The CRA, which clarified the Commission’s jurisdiction over retail forex 
transactions, also created the retail foreign exchange dealer designation, a 
new category of CFTC registrant for firms serving as counterparties in retail 
forex transactions.77  Retail foreign exchange dealers must register with the 
Commission as a retail foreign exchange dealer and maintain a minimum of 
$20 million in adjusted net capital.78 
4.  CFTC Enforcement Actions and Reparations Proceedings 
This section introduces CFTC administrative proceedings and 
enforcement actions in federal court and discusses their differences, 
including judicial review, to help readers better understand the causes and 
effects of the Commission’s decision in Gibraltar to file suit in federal 
court rather than proceeding administratively. 
a.  CFTC Administrative Proceedings 
Section 6(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, amended in 1974 as part 
of the CFTCA, empowers the CFTC to initiate administrative disciplinary 
proceedings against any person who violates the CEA or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder.79  The disciplinary hearing is held before an 
administrative law judge designated by the Commission80 who is 
empowered to prohibit violators from trading on contract markets, revoke 
or suspend their registrations, assess monetary penalties, and require 
restitution.81 
The CFTCA also established a reparations procedure, giving aggrieved 
investors the opportunity to seek redress before the Commission for a 
CFTC registrant’s alleged violations of the CEA or CFTC regulations.82  In 
 
Retail Customers at 2 (2002), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/
public/@cpfraudawarenessandprotection/documents/file/forex_advisoryretailcustomers.pdf.  
Although not required to register with the CFTC, the National Futures Association (NFA), 
the industry’s self-regulatory organization, requires most entities that solicit business for 
forex dealers to register with the NFA and be subject to its anti-fraud rules.  See NFA 
COMPLIANCE RULE 2-39 (2010), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/
nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-39&Section=4. 
 77. See CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–246, § 13,101, 122 Stat. 
1651, 2189–2204 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
§ 103, 88 Stat. 1389, 1392 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 9); 13A MARKHAM, supra 
note 56, § 23:1, at 23-2; Sackheim, supra note 21, at 451. 
 80. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2006); 13A MARKHAM, supra note 56, § 23:1, at 23-2 (explaining 
that the administrative law judge “oversees all initial motions, discovery and the hearing of 
the factual evidence”). 
 81. See 7 U.S.C. § 9; Sackheim, supra note 21, at 446, 456; Jerry W. Markham & Ellen 
R. Meltzer, Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act—Respondeat Superior, 
Aiding and Abetting, Supervision, and Scienter, 27 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1116 (1978). 
 82. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 
§ 106, 88 Stat. 1389, 1393 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 18); Markham, supra note 23 
at 87–88 (stating that the CFTC Act created a reparations procedure and made the 
Commission their adjudicative body); Markham & Meltzer, supra note 81, at 1116–17 
(same). 
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a reparations proceeding, administrative law judges are authorized to render 
an award for “actual damages proximately caused by” a registrant’s 
violation83 that a claimant may enforce in federal district court.84  If the 
award is not timely paid, the registrant faces an automatic bar from trading 
and suspension of her registration.85 
Following both disciplinary and reparations hearings, the administrative 
law judge may render an initial decision,86 which either party can appeal to 
the Commission.87  The Commission’s final orders are further appealable to 
the appropriate court of appeals,88 which reviews the Commission’s orders 
(like other agency actions) in accordance with the deferential standard set 
forth in Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).89 
Under the APA, reviewing courts must set aside agency actions and 
conclusions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law” or “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction.”90  Findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence 
standard, in which reviewing courts set aside any finding “unsupported by 
substantial evidence.”91  In the Commission’s case, findings of fact are 
upheld so long as supported by the weight, or preponderance, of the 
evidence.92 
 
 83. 7 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1). 
 84. Id. § 18(d). 
 85. Id. § 18(f). 
 86. 17 C.F.R. § 10.84 (2010) (disciplinary proceedings); id. § 12.314 (reparations 
hearings).  Unless the Commission specifically adopts the reasoning of an administrative law 
judge’s initial decision, it does not represent Commission precedent and is “not an 
appropriate basis for inferring limitations on reasoning included in a Commission decision.” 
In re Three Eight Corp., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 25,749 
at 40,444 (June 16, 1993). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 10.102 (discussing disciplinary proceedings); id. § 12.401 (reparations 
hearings).  The Commission “may affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or remand for further 
proceedings.” Id. § 10.104 (disciplinary proceedings); id. § 12.406 (reparations hearings). 
 88. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (“After the issuance of the order by the Commission, the person against 
whom it is issued may obtain a review of such order or such other equitable relief as to the 
court may seem just by filing in the United States court of appeals of the circuit in which the 
petitioner is doing business.”); id. § 18(e) (stating that any order of the Commission entered 
in connection with a reparations hearing “shall be reviewable on petition of any party 
aggrieved thereby, by the United States Court of Appeals for any circuit in which a hearing 
was held, or if no hearing was held, any circuit in which the appellee is located”). 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see Purdy v. CFTC, 968 F.2d 510, 518 n.21 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(explaining that “judicial review of the Commission’s final rulings are governed by the 
Administrative Procedures Act (‘APA’)[, which] applies to all administrative agencies, 
including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission”).  Section 706 charges reviewing 
courts to “decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 
5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See 7 U.S.C. § 9 (“[T]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by 
the weight of evidence, shall . . . be conclusive.”); 13A MARKHAM, supra note 56, § 23:20, at 
23-79 to -85 (listing cases). 
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b.  Enforcement Actions in Federal Court 
Section 6(c) of the CEA, also enacted as part of the CFTCA, empowers 
the CFTC to seek both temporary and permanent injunctions in federal 
district court whenever the Commission believes anyone “has engaged, is 
engaging, or is about to engage in” a violation of the CEA or the regulations 
promulgated thereunder93—thereby equipping the agency with a powerful 
weapon to protect the investing public and deter future violations of the 
CEA.94  The CFTC may also request, and the district court may award, civil 
penalties and ancillary remedies such as disgorgement, an accounting, or 
the appointment of a receiver.95  In the Gibraltar case, which is further 
detailed below, the CFTC chose to commence its enforcement action in the 
district court, seeking to enjoin Gibraltar, its principals, and FxCM from 
violating the CEA.96 
Review of a district court’s decision to issue an injunction, assess 
monetary fines, or award ancillary remedies differs from judicial review of 
CFTC administrative proceedings.  Unlike the Commission’s issuance of an 
order, filing suit in federal court is not considered an agency action,97 a 
distinction which deprives the Commission of the deferential standard of 
review set forth in the APA.  Instead, appellate courts review a district 
court’s factual findings for clear error98 and questions of law de novo.99 
 
 93. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a); see CFTC v. Cassidy, No. 08-CIV-9962 (GBD), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 52455, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010) (explaining that “7 U.S.C.  § 13a-1 . . 
. authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive relief against any person, or, to enforce 
compliance with the Act, whenever it shall appear to the Commission that such person has 
engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of 
any provision of the Act or any rule, regulation or order thereunder”); CFTC v. Efrosman, 
No. 05 Civ 08422 (KMW), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84529, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2009) 
(“Section 13a-1 states that courts have jurisdiction to hear claims arising from the CEA 
whenever it ‘shall appear’ to the CFTC that there has been a violation of the CEA.”); see 
also Michael S. Sackheim, Judicial Equitable Enforcement of the Commodities Laws, 32 
AM. U. L. REV. 945, 948-50 (1983). 
 94. Sackheim, supra note 93, at 950 (stating that “[a] permanent injunction granted in an 
action brought by the CFTC is a harsh form of equitable relief designed to prevent future 
violations of the [CEA]”). 
 95. Id. at 956. 
 96. See CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *74-75 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 97. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (incorporated by reference in id. § 701(b)(2)) (defining an 
“agency action” as “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or 
the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”). 
 98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (providing that “[f]indings of fact . . . must not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous”); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). 
 99. See CFTC v. Equity Fin. Grp., 572 F.3d 150, 154 n.8 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We review the 
District Court’s findings of fact for clear error, and we exercise plenary review over its 
interpretation of the law and its legal conclusions.”); CFTC v. Gibraltar Monetary Corp., 575 
F.3d 1180, 1186 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that “[t]he district court’s determination of the 
correct standard for vicarious liability under the relevant vicarious liability provisions is a 
matter of law,” but its “determination regarding the scope of vicarious liability and the 
principal-agent relationship is a question of fact”). 
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B.  Secondary Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act 
1.  The CEA’s Vicarious Liability Provision 
Since the inception of commodity futures trading in the United States in 
the mid-1850s,100 farm groups and their supporters in Congress have been 
suspicious of the practice and demanded its regulation.101  To curb 
perceived market abuses, legislators introduced over 200 bills calling for 
the “prohibition, supervision, or regulation” of commodities futures trading 
between 1884 and 1921.102  Despite the mounting populist pressure, 
however, comprehensive federal regulation of commodities trading was 
delayed until 1921, when roller-coaster commodity prices finally created 
enough momentum for legislation in the area.103 
The Future Trading Act of 1921,104 which taxed grain futures contracts, 
sought to curb market manipulation and excessive speculation, prevent 
fraud, and promote market stability.105  Among other things, this Act 
contained a vicarious liability provision in its definitions section, under a 
subsection entitled “[p]rincipals responsible for acts of agents.”106  Section 
2 of the Future Trading Act provides: 
The act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other person acting 
for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within 
the scope of his employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, 
or failure of such individual, association, partnership, corporation, or 
trust, as well as such official, agent, or other person.107 
 
 100. See William R. Johnson, Herbert Hoover and the Regulation of Grain Futures, in 
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1870:  ANTITRUST AND REGULATION DURING 
WORLD WAR I AND THE REPUBLICAN ERA 1917–1932, at 265, 265–66 (Robert F. Himmelberg 
ed., 1994). 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Note, Federal Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 832 
n.46 (1951); see also Note, Prevention of Commodity Futures Manipulation Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1374 n.4 (1941).  Farm-belt congressmen 
advocated such legislation “to break up the . . . system of swindling small farmers and poor 
people by alluring them into making ‘wind contracts’ with rich men about agricultural 
products that result nearly always in the strong wolves devouring the weak lambs.” 23 
CONG. REC. 5076 (June 6, 1892) (statement of Rep. Tillman).  Rep. George D. Tillman of 
South Carolina delivered this statement in connection to the proposed “anti-option” bill of 
1892, which despite strong support in the House, ultimately failed in the Senate. See 
Johnson, supra note 100, at 266 n.2. 
 103. See Johnson, supra note 100, at 266; 61 CONG. REC. 1312 (May 11, 1921) (statement 
of Rep. Tincher) (stating that “[t]here never was a time where there was more vicious 
fluctuations in the market”). 
 104. Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187 (1921), invalidated by Hill v. 
Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
 105. SEN. CAPPER, TAXING CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF GRAIN FOR FUTURE DELIVERY, AND 
OPTIONS FOR SUCH CONTRACTS, AND PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF BOARDS OF TRADE, 
ETC., S. REP. NO. 67-212, at 4–5 (1921). 
 106. Future Trading Act, Pub. L. No. 67-66, § 2, 42 Stat. 187 (1921), invalidated by Hill 
v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). 
 107. Id.  Neither the bill itself nor the extensive congressional record elaborated on the 
identity of those other persons, besides officers and agents, who would fall within the scope 
of the statute.  See 61 CONG. REC. 1312-31 (May 11, 1921); see also Jing Bian v. MG Fin., 
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This provision, which is nearly identical to other vicarious liability 
provisions in Title 7 of the United States Code,108 reflects “the evolution of 
legal thinking about a firm’s liability for the acts of agents.”109  Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the Future Trading Act as an 
unconstitutional application of Congress’s taxing power soon after its 
passage,110 the Court retained in full its vicarious liability provision in the 
reformulated Grain Futures Act of 1922.111  Congress used the provision 
again when it enacted the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936112 and the 
provision has remained virtually unchanged ever since.113  In 1976, when 
 
No. 08-R17, 2009 CFTC LEXIS 76, at *25 (Oct. 28, 2009) (stating that “[t]he reference to 
‘other person acting for’ another person or entity in [§ 2(a)(1)(B)] thus implies that 
respondeat superior under the Act applies to persons who act for others, but who do not fall 
within the usual definition of ‘agent’”); In re Glass, [1994–1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,787 at 44,238 (Sept. 11, 1996) (“There is no legislative history for 
Section 2(a)(1)[B].  It is generally known that this section is grounded in the theory of 
common law respondeat superior, yet intended to reach a wider range of relationships.”); 
Lobb v. J.T. McKerr & Co., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 24,568 at 36,441 n.13 (Dec. 14, 1989) (stating that the extent of relationships reached by § 
2(a)(1)(B) include not only common law agents, but also officials and other persons).  It 
appears, however, that Congress considered such a provision necessary to provide regulators 
with an added weapon to prevent perceived abuses in the marketplace. See 62 CONG. REC. 
9412 (June 26, 1922) (statement of Rep. Williams). 
 108. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 63 (2006) (discussing cotton standards); id. § 87d (grain 
standards); id. § 136l(b)(4) (environmental pesticide control); id. § 223 (live poultry dealers 
and handlers); id. § 473c-3 (cotton statistics and estimates); id. § 499p (perishable 
agricultural commodities); id. § 511l (tobacco inspection); id. § 2139 (transportation of 
animals); id. § 8313(c) (animal health protection).  Few courts have addressed these nearly 
identical provisions, although it is clear from courts’ decisions that the provisions’ language 
imposes a strict liability regime like § 2(a)(1)(B). See, e.g., Koam Produce, Inc. v. United 
States, 269 Fed. App’x 35, 37 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that a corporation may be held 
vicariously liable under PACA for its employees violative acts even if it was not aware of 
them); Kleiman & Hochberg, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 497 F.3d 681, 689 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (stating that PACA’s vicarious liability provision “simply makes applicable to 
wholesale produce merchants the principle of respondeat superior”); Post & Taback, Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Agric., 123 Fed. App’x 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that the plain language of 
§ 499p makes clear that employers need not have knowledge of their employees’ misconduct 
to be held vicariously liable); Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(stating that § 2(a)(1)(B) imposes strict liability on principals); United States v. Corbin Farm 
Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 526 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) 
(explaining that independent contractors may be held liable under the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act’s vicarious liability provision, § 136l(b)(4)). 
 109. In re Big Red Commodity Corp., [1984–1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 22,623 at 30,668 (June 7, 1985). 
 110. See Hill, 259 U.S. at 44. 
 111. Pub. L. No. 67-331, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 998 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B)).  This 
time, Congress grounded the Act in its commerce power.  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 in Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 
(1923). 
 112. Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, § 2, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); see CFTC 
v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180, 1188 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the CEA was 
enacted “to expand [the federal government’s] jurisdiction over commodities trading and 
introduce additional mechanisms to prevent fraud and manipulation”). 
 113. Reed v. Sage Grp., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 23,943 at 34,300 (Oct. 14, 1987) (stating that section 2(a)(1)(B) “has remained unchanged 
since its enactment more than 65 years ago”). 
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the CFTC promulgated its own vicarious liability provision, Regulation 
1.2,114 it adopted language nearly identical to that of § 2(a)(1)(B).115 
With the passage of the Futures Trading Act of 1982, Congress sought to 
distinguish the meaning of the Act’s long-standing vicarious liability 
provision from the CEA’s new controlling person provision, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 13c(b).116  The report states that the provision “in essence provides 
respondeat superior and general principal-agent standards for imposing 
liability on employers and principals for the acts of their employers or 
agents.”117  Although commentators considering the CEA’s vicarious 
liability provision once surmised that “[s]uits brought under section 2(a)(1) 
. . . trigger an agency law analysis,”118 the Commission and the federal 
courts now understand the provision as broader than the common law.119 
 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2009) (“The act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other 
person acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation or trust within the 
scope of his employment or office, shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such 
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust as well as of such official, agent, or 
other person.”).   
 115. See Rules Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 Fed. Reg. 3191, 3194 (Jan. 21, 
1976).  Although Regulation 1.2 does not supplement the meaning of the statutory provision, 
courts have held that it provides liability to the same extent as that provided by § 2(a)(1)(B) 
in those limited circumstances in which the CFTC may exercise regulatory jurisdiction but 
§ 2(a)(1)(B) does not apply. See, e.g., CFTC v. Liberty Mut. Grp., No. 07-21267-CIV, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 484, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2008) (stating that even if § 2(a)(1)(B) might 
not apply to certain off-exchange foreign currency transactions, Regulation 1.2 still applies); 
CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45129, at *71 n.7 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that although “the CFMA did not make the vicarious liability provision of the 
CEA applicable to [certain] off-exchange foreign currency transaction[s] . . . vicarious 
liability may be imposed pursuant to CFTC regulation 1.2”). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 105 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 3871, 
3954. 
 117. Id.  Congress further expressed that the new provision should become the sole “basis 
for imputing liability to a controlling person,” id., but its passage has not affected the scope 
of § 2(a)(1)(B). See Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966–67 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(explaining that “[t]he legislative history makes plain . . . that these additions were intended 
to supplement rather than displace the respondeat superior liability created by section 
2(a)(1)[B]”). 
 118. Sackheim, supra note 21, at 464–65 (“Section 2(a)(1) of the Act appears to adopt the 
common law doctrine of respondeat superior . . . .”); see Markham & Meltzer, supra note 81, 
at 1125–34.  Under common law agency, principals are only subject to liability to third 
parties harmed by an agent’s tortious conduct when it is within the scope of the agent’s 
actual or apparent authority or when the agent is an employee and the tort was committed 
within the scope of its employment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2005).  
Apparent authority exists where, based on manifestations traceable to the principal, the third 
party reasonably believes that the actor has authority to act on the principal’s behalf. See id. 
§ 2.0.  Actual authority, either express or implied, exists where both the principal and agent 
consent to the agency relationship and the principal exercises or has the right to exercise 
control over the agent. See id. §§ 1.01, 2.01. 
 119. See Committee on Futures Regulation, Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York, Secondary and Supervisory Liability Under the Commodity Exchange Act:  An 
Update, 56 RECORD 240, 242 (2001) (“[T]he CFTC and courts have continued to interpret 
this vicarious liability provision broadly and aggressively. . . . [They] have expanded the 
application of Section 2(a)(1) vicarious liability to futures industry participants who might 
not be liable under traditional agency principles.”); Guttman v. CFTC, 197 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 
1999); Dohmen-Ramirez v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1988); Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 
754 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
2.  Controlling Person and Aiding and Abetting Liability under the CEA 
Apart from § 2(a)(1)(B), the CEA provides two additional forms of 
secondary liability—aiding and abetting liability and controlling person 
liability.  Section 13(b) of the CEA, the CEA’s controlling person 
provision, provides that anyone who “directly or indirectly” controls 
another who has violated the CEA “may be held liable for such violation 
. . . to the same extent as [the] controlled person.”120  This provision applies 
only in CFTC enforcement actions, in which the Commission must prove 
the controlling person’s lack of good faith.121  To be liable as a controlling 
person under this section, the person need only possess the power to direct 
the primary violator; actual involvement in the primary violator’s illegal 
acts is not required.122 
 Section 13(a) of the Act provides that anyone who willfully aids and 
abets a violation of the commodities laws “may be held responsible for such 
violation as a principal.”123  To be liable under the provision, the purported 
aider and abetter must have acted willfully.124  Unlike the CEA’s 
controlling person provision, aiding and abetting liability under the Act is 
not limited to CFTC enforcement proceedings.  Rather, like § 2(a)(1)(B), 
the CEA contains a private cause of action for aiding and abetting 
liability.125 
C.  Chevron Doctrine 
In appeals from Commission orders or district court decisions, the 
meaning of a particular provision of the CEA is often at issue—the CFTC 
will offer one meaning of the statute and the defendant, presumably to 
avoid liability, will offer another.126  In these situations, where an 
 
855 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1988); Jing Bian v. MG Fin., LLC, No. 08-R17, 2009 CFTC LEXIS 
76 (Oct. 28, 2009); Knight v. First Commercial Fin. Grp., Inc., [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,942 (Jan. 14, 1997). 
 120. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) (2006); see CFTC v. Baragosh, 278 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Monieson v. CFTC, 996 F.2d 852, 859–60 (7th Cir. 1993).  Under the CEA, the term 
“person” includes “individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts.” 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1a(28). 
 121. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b); see Baragosh, 278 F.3d at 330; 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 
36, § 5.09[11], at 5-243 to -244 (Supp. 2003). 
 122. See Baragosh, 278 F.3d at 330; 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 5.09[11], at 
5-244 (Supp. 2003).  Those categorized as controlling persons would generally include the 
firm itself, its principal officers and supervisors, the president of the firm, or its sole 
shareholder, if any.  See id. 
 123. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a). 
 124. See id. 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 5.09[10], at 5-240 (Supp. 2002-2); 
Markham & Meltzer, supra note 81, at 1153. 
 125. See 7 U.S.C. § 25; 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 36, § 5.09[10], at 5-240 (Supp. 
2002-2) (explaining that “aiders and abettors may be sued under section 22’s private remedy 
for injured investors”).  Originally, the provision only applied in administrative proceedings, 
but a 1983 amendment to the law removed the term. See Fleming v. Bank of Boston Corp., 
127 F.R.D. 30, 37 (D. Mass. 1989); see also Markham & Meltzer, supra note 81, at 1147–48 
(providing background information on the provision’s enactment). 
 126. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) (jurisdiction over state law 
counterclaims); DiPlacido v. CFTC, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 22692, at *6–7 
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administrative agency proffers its own construction of a statute it is 
authorized to administer, reviewing courts are guided by the two-step 
framework articulated by the Supreme Court in the landmark case, Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.127 
Under Chevron doctrine, the reviewing court must first determine 
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”128  
If so, the court must yield “to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”129  If, however, the court concludes that the statute is silent or 
ambiguous, it shall defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is 
“based on a permissible construction of the statute.”130 
Professors Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman have further 
identified an antecedent step, fittingly dubbed Step Zero, where courts 
determine whether Chevron applies at all.131  The Court has explained that 
an agency’s interpretation merits Chevron deference only “when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming 
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”132 
 
(2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2009) (manipulation); CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(spot transactions); CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); Wilson v. 
CFTC, 322 F.3d 555, 559–60 (8th Cir. 2003) (wash sales); MBH Commodity Advisors, Inc. 
v. CFTC, 250 F.3d 1052, 1059-64 (7th Cir. 2001) (standard of review); Commodity Trend 
Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d 981, 987–92 (7th Cir. 2000) (commodity trading advisor); 
First Am. Disc. Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1012–14 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (minimum 
financial requirement); R & W Tech. Servs., Ltd. v. CFTC, 205 F.3d 165, 174 n.39 (5th Cir. 
2000) (same); Haekal v. Refco, Inc., 198 F.3d 37, 41–42 (2d Cir. 1999) (bond requirement); 
Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1987) (mandatory arbitration); 
Premex, Inc. v. CFTC, 785 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1986) (minimum financial 
requirement); Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 F.2d 767, 774–76 (9th Cir. 1985) (choice of 
sanctions). 
 127. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 128. Id. at 842. 
 129. Id. at 843.  When Congress explicitly leaves “a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency” to promulgate regulations in that area.  Courts 
must give such regulations “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 843–44. 
 130. Id. at 843.  Courts have justified this doctrine of deference to executive agencies on 
the grounds that interpretation of ambiguous statutes is an exercise in policymaking, which is 
outside the realm of the courts. See id. at 843 (stating that when Congress charges “‘an 
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created’” scheme, it “‘necessarily 
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress’” (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974))); Pauley v. 
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (“[R]esolution of ambiguity in a statutory 
text is often more a question of policy than of law.” (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2085–88 (1990))); RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 160–61 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that 
Congress often leaves many policy decisions unaddressed when enacting a statute on 
account of “inadequate expertise, inadequate time, inadequate foresight, or problems 
inherent in collective decisionmaking”). 
 131. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
836 (2001); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
 132. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  The Mead Court 
continued:  “Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some 
other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” Id. at 227.  The Mead test has 
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While the Court has determined that an agency’s construction of a statute 
articulated by way of formal adjudicative proceedings and notice-and-
comment rulemaking generally qualify for Chevron deference,133 agency 
interpretations that lack the force of law such as those advanced in opinion 
letters,134 policy statements, agency manuals, enforcement guidelines,135 
customs ruling letters,136 and litigating positions137 do not.138  Where, as in 
Gibraltar, the CFTC has advanced a construction of the CEA derived from 
a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, courts have 
generally deferred to the Commission so long as its interpretation was 
reasonable.139 
II.  BREAKING DOWN CFTC V. GIBRALTAR MONETARY CORP. 
In Gibraltar, the Eleventh Circuit observed that there is no consensus 
among the circuit courts as to the appropriate standard for vicarious liability 
 
returned to the courts the role of determining what the law means. See Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?:  Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the 
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 751 (2002).  Professor Krotoszynski 
explains: 
A reviewing court that wishes to sustain an agency interpretation will find an 
implied delegation, whereas a court that wishes to displace an agency’s 
interpretation will find that such an implied delegation of lawmaking power does 
not exist.  Because the inference will arise not from any direct language in the 
statute, but rather from the overall structure and operation of the law, a reviewing 
court will face few practical constraints in granting or withholding Chevron 
deference. 
Id. 
 133. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); 
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (noting that Chevron applies to legal 
interpretations adopted by agencies in formal adjudications); PIERCE, supra note 130, at 172-
73 (explaining that the Chevron deference applies to formal adjudications and notice-and-
comment rulemaking); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1316 
(2008) (stating that legal interpretations by agencies adopted through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures or through formal adjudications warrant Chevron deference). 
 134. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 135. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. 
 136. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
 137. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (“We have never 
applied [Chevron deference] to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by 
regulations, rulings, or administrative practice.”). 
 138. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  Such interpretations instead warrant the less yielding 
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
See Criddle, supra note 133, at 1275 (stating that where agency interpretations do not 
warrant Chevron deference, courts “consider instead whether deference is warranted under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.”).  Under Skidmore deference, “[t]he weight of [an agency 
interpretation] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.”  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Krotoszynski, supra note 132, at 739–40 
(explaining that agency expertise is the reasoning underlying Skidmore deference). 
 139. See supra note 126 (listing cases in which courts have deferred to the CFTC’s 
construction of the CEA). 
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under the CEA.140  The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have seemingly embraced the CFTC’s totality of the circumstances 
approach, in which any one factor, including control, is not dispositive of an 
agency relationship.141  The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, has looked to 
common law agency principles when considering vicarious liability in the 
commodities context—without specific reference to the CEA’s vicarious 
liability provision, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B).142 
The Eleventh Circuit in Gibraltar, however, became the first federal 
court of appeals to determine that, like common law agency, a finding of 
agency under the CEA’s vicarious liability provision requires control of the 
agent by the principal.143  Moreover, in dismissing the CFTC’s totality of 
the circumstances approach, the court essentially disregarded a key element 
of both parties’ briefs—namely, whether the CFTC’s interpretation of the 
CEA’s vicarious liability provision warranted judicial deference in 
accordance with Chevron doctrine.144  Before discussing the Eleventh 
Circuit’s opinion, this Part provides an overview of Gibraltar’s facts, 
summarizes the district court’s opinion, and sets forth key points from the 
parties’ appellate briefs. 
A. Gibraltar’s Fraud and FxCM 
Ten years prior to forming Gibraltar, Jayson Kline and Charles Fremer 
worked together at Bachus & Stratton Commodities, Inc. of Pompano 
Beach, Florida.145  Touting its “financial wizard whose ‘Einstein software’ 
made commodities trading almost a sure bet,”146 Bachus and its employees 
reaped $5.9 million in commissions from churning its customers’ accounts 
while its customers lost most—if not all—of their investments.147  The 
CFTC and the National Futures Association (NFA) charged the firm with 
sales solicitation fraud and revoked its registration, and the U.S. District 
 
 140. See Gib. Monetary Corp. v. CFTC, 575 F.3d 1180, 1187 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]ppellate case law reveals no clear precedent . . . .  District courts, as expected, are split 
on the issue as well.”). 
 141. See id. at 1187 & nn.15–16; see, e.g., Guttman v. CFTC, 197 F.3d 33, 39–40 (2d Cir. 
1999); Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288, 1292–93 (7th Cir. 1988); Dohmen-Ramirez v. 
CFTC, 837 F.2d 847, 858 (9th Cir. 1988); Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 967–68 
(7th Cir. 1986). 
 142. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d at 1187 & n.14; Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM 
Investor Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 743 (8th Cir. 2003); Gunderson v. ADM Investor Servs., 
Inc., No. 99-4032, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 20971, at *5 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000). 
 143. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d at 1189. 
 144. See id. at 1188. 
 145. CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *4–6 (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2006), aff’d, 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009); 
Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties under 
the Commodity Exchange Act at 4–5, CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132 (S.D. 
Fla. May 30, 2006) [hereinafter CEA Complaint]. 
 146. Lunan, supra note 10, at A1. 
 147. See id. 
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Court for the Southern District of Florida permanently enjoined Kline from 
violating the Commodity Exchange Act.148 
New York-based Forex Capital Markets, a registered futures commission 
merchant and Forex Dealer Member of the NFA since 2001,149 is among 
the world’s largest dealers of retail off-exchange foreign currency futures 
and options transactions.150  As a dealer, FxCM trades, for its own account, 
spot forex and forex options with members of the public, many of whom 
are unsophisticated retail traders like Mrs. McDonald.151  Since 
commencing operations in 1999, FxCM has twice settled charges with the 
NFA for rule violations.  The first charge—using deficient promotional 
material—settled in 2005 for $110,000.152  The second—for not 
implementing a written anti-money laundering program and for failure to 
supervise—settled in 2007 for $175,000.153 
In February 2002, Kline and Fremer established the Gibraltar Monetary 
Corporation in Boca Raton, Florida to generate commission income by 
soliciting members of the public to trade forex with an outside firm.154  At 
 
 148. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *74–75; CEA Complaint, 
supra note 145, at 4–5. 
 149. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *7; Complaint at 1–2, In 
re Forex Capital Markets LLC, Case No. 06-BCC-046 (NFA Dec. 8, 2006).  The NFA’s 
Forex Dealer Members (FDM) are futures commission merchants that “are the counterparty 
or offer to be the counterparty to” retail off-exchange foreign currency transactions. NFA 
BYLAW 306 (2010), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx? 
RuleID=BYLAW%20306&Section=3; see NFA BYLAW 1507(b), available at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=BYLAW%201507&Secti
on=3 (defining forex as foreign currency transactions entered into with persons that are not 
eligible contract participants and not executed or subject to the rules of a contract market). 
 150. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *7; Complaint, supra 
note 149, at 1–2; Forex Capital Markets Company Profile, http://www.fxcm.com/company-
profile.jsp (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (stating that FxCM “is one of the largest Forex Dealer 
Members”).  Retail foreign exchange transactions are those entered into with persons who 
are not “eligible contract participants” as described by 7 U.S.C. § 1a(12). See 7 U.S.C. 
§ 1a(12) (2006). 
 151. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *14–16; Brief of 
Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 5.  Spot forex transactions are those in which one 
currency is bought for another, and they are exchanged immediately. See CFTC v. Int’l Fin. 
Servs. (N.Y.), Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 482, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 152. See In re Forex Capital Markets LLC, Case No. 05-BCC-025 (NFA Nov. 28, 2005).  
Specifically, the NFA charged FxCM with violating Compliance Rule 2-36(b)(1), which 
makes it a violation of NFA rules for a FDM or its associates to “[c]heat, defraud or deceive, 
or attempt to cheat, defraud or deceive any other person.” See NFA COMPLIANCE RULE 2-
36(b)(1) (2010), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.
aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-36&Section=4. 
 153. See In re Forex Capital Markets LLC, Case No. 06-BCC-046 (NFA Sept. 27, 2006).  
In this case, the NFA Panel found that FxCM violated Compliance Rules 2-9(c) and 2-36(e).  
Rule 2-9(c) requires futures commission merchant members to “develop and implement a 
written anti-money laundering program.”  NFA COMPLIANCE RULE 2-9(C) (2010), available 
at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-
9&Section=4.  Rule 2-36(e) provides that FDMs and their associates with supervisory duties 
“shall diligently supervise its employees and agents in the conduct of their forex activities 
for or on behalf of the Forex Dealer Member.” NFA COMPLIANCE RULE 2-36(E) (2010), 
available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfamanual/NFAManual.aspx?RuleID=RULE%202-
36&Section=4. 
 154. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *3–4. 
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the time, neither Gibraltar nor its employees were registered with the CFTC 
or NFA in any capacity.155  The Gibraltar scheme was launched in earnest 
when, in April of that year, FxCM reached an agreement with Fremer in 
which Gibraltar received hefty commissions for referring its customers to 
open options accounts with FxCM on an exclusive basis.156 
Luring prospective investors with claims of two hundred to three hundred 
percent returns and other false promises,157 Gibraltar’s salespeople 
persuaded Mrs. McDonald and over 270 others to open accounts with 
FxCM, and to trade forex under Gibraltar’s “expert” guidance.158  Once the 
customers agreed to open an account there, the firm mailed them several 
forms, including FxCM’s account opening documentation and a limited 
power of attorney granting Gibraltar discretion to trade its customers’ 
accounts.159  Those customers then returned the signed paperwork to 
Gibraltar, but sent their money directly to FxCM.160  Gibraltar would later 
forward the account opening documentation to FxCM, which reviewed the 
materials to ensure that Gibraltar’s customers satisfied its customer 
qualification standards.161 
Those that satisfied FxCM’s standards must have soon regretted their 
decisions to open accounts there.  Gibraltar’s “expert” traders actually had 
little trading experience,162 and some even had criminal backgrounds.163  
They placed large bets on risky options, which ultimately resulted in 
“nearly ninety-five percent of Gibraltar’s customers los[ing] most if not all” 
of the three million dollars they invested.164  Meanwhile, Gibraltar and 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at *8.  “Gibraltar generated at least $879,379.50 in commissions from at least 267 
members of the retail public, who invested $3,022,998.39 to engage in trading of foreign 
currency option contracts through FXCM . . . . FXCM charged Gibraltar’s customers $50 per 
round turn on trades and it received at least $200,000 in commissions.” CEA Complaint, 
supra note 145, at 2. 
 157. Id. at *45–46.  Gibraltar’s misrepresentations to its customers included the 
following: 
(1) that Gibraltar customers could obtain 200% to 300% returns on their 
investments in a short period of time; (2) for every $.01 movement in the foreign 
currency market Gibraltar customers could make $ 1,000.00 in profit; (3) political 
conditions, such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the then-expected 
war with Iraq, would affect the foreign currency markets in a manner that would 
increase the likelihood that Gibraltar’s customers would realize profits; (4) that 
most other Gibraltar customers were profiting from their investments; and (5) that 
as a result of Gibraltar’s, and/or Johnson’s, extensive trading experience none of 
Gibraltar’s clients lost money. . . . 
Id. 
 158. Id. at *3–4. 
 159. Id. at *9–10. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at *45. 
 163. Id. at *44–51; CEA Complaint, supra note 145, at 10–13. 
 164. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *47; see CEA Complaint, 
supra note 145, at 10–13. 
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FxCM made out like thieves, together generating over one million dollars in 
commissions and fees.165 
B.  The District Court’s Decision 
Seeking injunctive relief, monetary fines, and various ancillary remedies 
against Gibraltar, Fremer, Kline, Johnson, and FxCM,166 the CFTC filed 
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on 
February 10, 2004.167  The parties presented their case during a two-week 
jury trial that culminated on September 12, 2005, and the district judge 
issued an opinion on May 30, 2006.168 
The district judge held that Gibraltar and its principals, Kline, Fremer, 
and Johnson, were liable for the company’s repeated material 
misrepresentations and omissions in soliciting members of the public to 
trade and invest with the firm.169 Specifically, the court determined that 
Johnson, Gibraltar’s account executive, violated 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b), which 
makes it unlawful to participate in commodity options transactions in 
violation of CFTC rules, and also Regulations 32.9(a) and (c), which forbid 
engaging in fraud and deceit in connection with such transactions.170  The 
court held Kline and Fremer liable as controlling persons of Johnson 
pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b).171 
The court, however, declined to hold FxCM vicariously liable for 
Gibraltar’s frauds.  Deciding that the CFMA foreclosed application of 
§ 2(a)(1)(B) to the off-exchange forex transactions in question,172 the court 
 
 165. CEA Complaint, supra note 145, at 2.  Gibraltar generated at least $879,379.50 in 
commissions from this arrangement and FxCM generated more than $200,000. Id. 
 166. Id. at 3. 
 167. Id. at 21.  As explained above, the CFTC’s decision to litigate in federal court 
instead of initiating an administrative disciplinary proceeding, empowered the agency to 
seek an injunction but deprived them of the APA’s deferential standard of review. See supra 
Part I.A.4. 
 168. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *1–2. 
 169. Id. at *42–60. 
 170. Id. at *42–57; 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2006) (making it unlawful to “offer to enter into, 
enter into or confirm the execution of, any transaction involving any commodity [option] . . . 
contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the [CFTC] prohibiting any such transaction or 
allowing any such transaction under such terms and conditions as the [CFTC] shall 
prescribe”); 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (2010) (declaring it “unlawful for any person directly or 
indirectly:  (a) [t]o cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud any other person . . . [or] 
(c) [t]o deceive or attempt to deceive any other person by any means whatsoever; in or in 
connection with an offer to enter into, the entry into, or the confirmation of the execution of, 
any commodity option transaction”). 
 171. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *55–60; 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) 
(providing that “[a]ny person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person who has 
violated any provision of [the CEA] or any of the rules, regulations, or orders [promulgated 
thereunder] may be held liable for such violation in any action brought by the Commission 
to the same extent as such controlled person”). 
 172. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *60–61, 62 n.7 (explaining 
that although the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) “did not make the 
vicarious liability provision of the CEA applicable to [certain] off-exchange foreign currency 
transaction[s] . . . vicarious liability may be imposed pursuant to CFTC regulation 1.2.”); see 
7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)(C).  Although the CFMA only specifically subjected those transactions to 
the CEA’s anti-fraud provisions when the district court decided Gibraltar in 2006, a 2008 
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instead analyzed the FxCM-Gibraltar relationship under CFTC Regulation 
1.2, a vicarious liability provision that parrots the language of 
§ 2(a)(1)(B).173  Although the court embarked on its vicarious liability 
analysis with the mantra that “whether one is an agent for another depends 
on an assessment of the totality of circumstances[,]”174 the court ultimately 
undertook a common law agency analysis,175 in part because the CFTC 
itself had argued common law agency principles in its response to FxCM’s 
summary judgment motion.176 
The court first determined that express actual authority was lacking 
because the parties never executed an express agreement to form an agency 
relationship.177  It also rejected agency under an implied actual authority 
theory, finding that, from the parties’ course of conduct, they failed to 
consent to the formation of an agency relationship, FxCM did not provide a 
sufficient degree of operational support to Gibraltar, and FxCM exercised 
little control over the firm.178  The court last considered the relationship 
 
amendment to the law subjected all off-exchange forex transactions to the CEA’s vicarious 
liability provision as well. See CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008, § 13,101, Pub. L. 110-
246, 122 Stat. 1651, 2189–2204 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(c)(2)). 
 173. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *61–62 n.7. 
 174. Id. at *63 (citing Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988)).  In so 
doing, the district court cited a number of cases supporting that approach, including the 
Second Circuit’s Guttman decision and the Seventh Circuit’s Rosenthal and Stotler 
decisions. See id. at *62–63.  Unlike Gibraltar, which began as an action for injunctive relief 
in federal district court, each of those cases were appeals from Commission orders 
expansively applying the totality of the circumstances approach. See Guttman v. CFTC, 197 
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 1999); Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, 855 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1988); Rosenthal & 
Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1986).  As such, those courts had far less latitude to 
second-guess the finding of vicarious liability in the Commission’s order than the district 
court did in the first instance in Gibraltar. See supra note 167. 
 175. See Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *63–71 (examining the 
FxCM-Gibraltar relationship under actual authority—both express and implied—and 
apparent authority theories and concluding that an agency relationship did not exist). 
 176. See id. at *64 (“The CFTC relies upon both actual and apparent authority theories to 
support its argument that an implied agency relationship existed between Gibraltar and 
FxCM.”); Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Response to FXCM’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 8–10, CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-DIMITROULEAS 
(S.D. Fla. May 12, 2005).  The CFTC’s reference to common law agency principles in its 
response to FxCM’s summary judgment motion is indeed quite puzzling.  The argument was 
absent from the Commission’s argument in its response to FxCM’s motion to dismiss and in 
its brief to the Eleventh Circuit. See Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 33 
(explaining that “the statutory and regulatory language—‘official, agent or other person’—
indicates that section 2(a)(1)(B) and Rule 1.2 can extend to persons who may not technically 
be agents at common law”); Plaintiff CFTC’s Response to Defendant Forex Capital Markets 
LLC’s Motion to Dismiss at 9–11, CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., No. 04-80132-CIV-
DIMITROULEAS (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2004). 
 177. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *63. 
 178. Id. at *64–67.  To guide its implied actual authority analysis, the court applied a 
framework articulated by a CFTC administrative law judge in an initial decision. See id. at 
*64 (“To demonstrate the existence of implied actual authority a party must provide 
evidence that:  (1) the purported agent and purported principal acquiesced to the relationship, 
(2) the purported principal gave sufficient support to the purported agent, and (3) the 
purported principal exercised sufficient control over the purported agent.” (citing Buckner v. 
Refco, Inc., [2000–2002 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,532 (April 25, 
2001))).  As the Eleventh Circuit correctly pointed out, this framework is actually found in a 
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under an apparent authority theory, concluding that the evidence adduced at 
trial was insufficient to support a finding of apparent agency because the 
CFTC never made clear which, if any, representations of FxCM were relied 
upon by Gibraltar’s customers in opening accounts there.179 
The court ultimately granted the CFTC’s request for permanent 
injunctions against all defendants—with the exception of FxCM— 
prohibiting future violations of the CEA and barring the defendants from 
engaging in any commodities-related activities.180  Turning to the issue of 
ancillary remedies, the court first held Kline, Fremer, and Johnson jointly 
and severally liable for restitution to Gibraltar’s clients in the amount of 
$2,752,377.50, the amount of its customers’ total losses.181  The court also 
imposed civil monetary penalties against Fremer for $352,011, Johnson for 
$191,367, and Kline for $240,000.182  Disappointed over the district court’s 
refusal to hold FxCM liable for Gibraltar’s frauds, the Commission decided 
to appeal.183 
C.  Arguments from the Briefs 
The section below recounts the arguments offered by the CFTC and 
FxCM in the briefs they submitted to the Eleventh Circuit on appeal. 
1.  The CFTC’s Briefs 
The Commission filed its principal brief with the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals on February 9, 2007.184  The CFTC contended that the district 
court misapplied the legal standard for determining agency relationships 
under the CEA’s vicarious liability provision,185 a decision the CFTC 
claimed would encourage “foreign currency dealers wishing to work with 
 
different CFTC initial decision.  CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180, 1185 n.10 
(11th Cir. 2009) (presuming that the district court meant to cite Webster v. Refco, [1998–
1999 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,578 (Feb. 1, 1999)).  Nevertheless, it 
raises a moot point, as neither administrative law judge’s initial decision carries precedential 
value. See supra note 86. 
 179. Gib. Monetary Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45129, at *64–71. 
 180. Id. at *74. 
 181. Id. at *77. 
 182. Id. at *80–81 (quoting CFTC v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1604, 
1316 (S.D. Fla. 2005)).  The court declined to order disgorgement, finding the civil monetary 
penalties “sufficient ‘to ensure that the Defendants did not profit’ from their fraudulent 
conduct.” Id. at *81. 
 183. See CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 184. See Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 48.  The CFTC devoted the first 
section of its argument in the brief to its contention that the district court erred by holding 
that § 2(c)(2)(C) precluded application of § 2(a)(1)(B) to the off-exchange foreign currency 
transactions at issue in Gibraltar. Id. at 20–31.  That issue, once contested, is now settled.  As 
noted above, the 2008 amendments to the CEA in the CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(CRA) clarified Congress’s intent by making the CEA’s vicarious liability provision 
expressly applicable to such transactions. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.  
 185. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 31–46. 
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disreputable marketing companies . . . to model their working relationship 
on the one here.”186 
After muddling its stance earlier in the litigation,187 the Commission 
articulated its long-held position that vicarious liability under § 2(a)(1)(B) 
is broader than common law principal-agent liability.188  Whereas 
principals at common law are vicariously liable only for the tortious acts of 
their agents and employees, the CEA also makes them liable for the acts of 
an “official, agent, or other person,”189 such as an independent 
contractor,190 so long as the “agent” is acting in furtherance of the 
agency.191 
Noting that “[t]he ascription of agency is a purposive, policy-oriented 
act,”192 the Commission argued that the imposition of vicarious liability to 
FxCM was necessary in this case to further the valuable policy of 
encouraging futures commission merchants to weed out swindling soliciting 
brokers like Gibraltar.193  This policy was particularly relevant here, the 
CFTC noted, because entities like Gibraltar that solicit customers solely for 
off-exchange forex dealers like FxCM are not required to register with the 
CFTC as introducing brokers.194 
 
 186. Id. at 32.  The Commission also conveyed the policy implications of the district 
court’s decision: 
The district court creates an opening for regulated foreign currency dealers to spin 
off marketing functions to unregulated agents who may have little capital and less 
incentive to deal fairly and honestly with customers.  At the same time, the court’s 
error allows unscrupulous futures commission merchants to enjoy the fruits of 
their agents’ conduct without fear of recourse if the agents break the law.  In these 
circumstances, futures commission merchants have little incentive to assure that 
their agents obey the law. 
Id. at 18. 
 187. Compare Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Response to FXCM’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 176, at 8–10 (evaluating FxCM-Gibraltar under Florida 
agency law, and considering the concepts of actual and apparent authority), with Plaintiff 
CFTC’s Response to Defendant Forex Capital Market LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 
176, at 3 (stating that vicarious liability under the CEA, which does not require control, is 
determined “on an overall assessment of the totality of the circumstances of each case” 
(quoting Berisko v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1984–1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 22,772 at 31,223 (Oct. 1, 1985))). 
 188. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 32–33. 
 189. Id. at 33 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added); see Lobb v. J.T. 
McKerr & Co., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,568 at 36,441 
n.13 (Dec. 14, 1989). 
 190. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 33 (citing Bogard v. Abraham-Reitz & 
Co., [1984–1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,273 at 29,393 (July 5, 
1984)); see Lobb, [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 36,444; 
Bogard, [1984–1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 29,393 (stating that 
“even if [one] were an independent contractor whose conduct in the performance of the 
services undertaken was not controlled by [the purported principal], that status would not 
itself preclude his being [an] agent”). 
 191. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 33 (citing Stotler and Co. v. CFTC, 855 
F.2d 1288, 966 (7th Cir. 1986)). 
 192. Id. at 34 (citing Dohmen-Ramirez v. CFTC, 837 F.2d 847, 858 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 193. Id. at 34–35. 
 194. See id. at 34–35; supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
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The CFTC maintained that courts should employ a totality of the 
circumstances test, which has long been utilized by the Commission to 
analyze agency under § 2(a)(1)(B).195  This approach, under which any one 
factor, including control, is not dispositive of an agency relationship, has 
been applied by the CFTC since its first articulation in the Commission’s 
1984 Bogard decision.196  Perhaps more importantly, the Commission’s use 
of the test had been upheld by several courts of appeal in subsequent 
years.197  Under this framework, the Commission argued, the traditional 
common law framework of actual and apparent authority does not apply.198 
In support of that position, the CFTC analogized Gibraltar with Reed v. 
Sage Group, Inc.,199 a 1987 reparations action in which the Commission 
articulated a framework for analyzing futures commission merchant- 
introducing broker relationships for purposes of establishing agency under 
§ 2(a)(1)(B).200  In Reed, the Commission relied on several factors to 
 
 195. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 33–34; see, e.g., Knight v. First 
Commercial Grp., [1996–1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,942 at 
44,553–54 (Jan. 14, 1997) (explaining that pursuant to § 2(a)(1)(B), a putative principal is 
derivatively liable for the wrongdoing of another so long as he was “acting for” the other at 
the time of the wrongdoing and that CFTC precedent provides that a totality of the 
circumstances test is employed in this determination); Bogard, [1984–1986 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 29,393 (“[A]ny person ‘acting for’ another ‘within the scope 
of [an] employment or office,’ is an agent, whose acts are attributable to the principal. . . . 
[T]he agent [need not] be registered with the Commission or be known by any particular title 
. . . in order to confer liability upon the principal.” (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1976)); Berisko v. 
Eastern Capital Corp., [1984–86 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,772 at 
31,223 (Oct. 1, 1985) (“Whether one person is an agent acting for another turns not on any 
one fact or talismanic formula, but on an overall assessment of the totality of the 
circumstances in each case.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 196. See Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 33–34 (citing cases). 
 197. See id. at 34 (citing Dohmen-Ramirez, 837 F.2d at 858).  In Dohmen-Ramirez, a 
reparations action, Bert Dohmen-Ramirez, a registered commodity trading advisor and 
president and owner of Wellington Advisory, appealed a Commission order holding him and 
his company vicariously liable for the fraudulent misrepresentations of Jon Handy, an 
associated person of futures commission merchant Murlas Brothers Commodities, to Ronald 
Ho, an airport employee. See Dohmen-Ramirez, 837 F.2d at 850.  The Commission had 
affirmed the administrative law judge’s finding of vicarious liability against Wellington and 
Dohmen-Ramirez because of their use of Handy to distribute its forms, their commission-
splitting arrangement, their reference to Handy as a “subcontracted advisor,” and their 
frequent consultations with Handy on the management of Ho’s account. See Ho v. Dohmen-
Ramirez, [1986–1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,391 at 33,052 (Nov. 
21, 1986).  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s order on appeal, 
noting that “it is not necessary to show control to establish agency under the CEA.” 
Dohmen-Ramirez, 837 F.2d at 858–61.  The weight of the evidence supported the 
Commission’s finding that an agency relationship existed between Dohmen-Ramirez and 
Wellington and Handy. See id at 858–59. 
 198. Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 41. In addition to arguing that Gibraltar 
was FxCM’s agent under the totality of the circumstances test, the CFTC made the 
alternative argument that Gibraltar and FxCM formed an agency relationship even under a 
common law analysis.  See id. at 40–46. 
 199. Id. at 35–40.  For general information about introducing brokers, see supra Part 
I.A.3. 
 200. Reed v. Sage Grp., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
23,943 (Oct. 14, 1987).  In Reed, Stanley M. Reed sought to hold Murlas Commodities, a 
futures commission merchant vicariously liable for the frauds of Sage Group, its introducing 
broker, and Russ Thiessen, Sage’s associated person. Id. at 34,297–98.  Thiessen persuaded 
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determine that the introducing broker was the futures commission 
merchant’s agent, including “the introducing broker’s use of account-
opening documents provided by the futures commission merchant, the 
futures commission merchant’s provision of market information to the 
introducing broker for the use of customers, and use of a form contract 
drafted by the futures commission merchant to govern the parties’ 
relationship.”201  The CFTC asserted that those factors, particularly 
FxCM’s use of Gibraltar as a conduit for its account opening forms and the 
parties’ exclusive dealing, were also present in Gibraltar, thus indicating 
that the court ought to hold FxCM liable for Gibraltar’s frauds.202  
Last, but certainly not least, the Commission argued that Chevron 
doctrine required the court to defer to the Commission’s interpretation of 
the CEA’s vicarious liability provision because of its exclusive 
administration of the CEA and its specialized expertise of commodities law 
and practice.203  Although the agency seemingly relied on a Skidmore 
rationale to support the agency deference argument in its principal brief,204 
the Commission reformulated and expanded on that argument in its reply, 
contending that its interpretation of the provision was grounded in formal 
adjudications, that the statute was ambiguous, and that its construction of 
the provision was a reasonable one.205 
The Commission contended that its interpretation of § 2(a)(1)(B) was not 
a mere litigating position devised for the lone purpose of holding FxCM 
liable for Gibraltar’s frauds, but rather an interpretation long articulated by 
 
Reed, a reverend, to invest with Murlas by promising that he would make “a ‘hell’ of a lot of 
money,” which as the administrative law judge humorously noted, is awfully “[o]dd 
language for a preacher to accept.” Reed v. Sage Grp., [1986–1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. 
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,144 at 32,364 (July 9, 1986).  Not surprisingly, Thiessen’s claims 
were nothing but a load of hot air.  The preacher ultimately lost virtually all of the $23,800 
he invested through Sage. Reed, [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 
34,297–98; Reed, [1986–1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 32,365. 
 201. See Reply Brief of Appellant CFTC at 12, CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 
1180 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-14270-C).  The CFTC also directed the court to the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Stotler & Co. v. CFTC, in which the court upheld a Commission order 
holding Stotler & Co., a futures commission merchant, vicariously liable for frauds 
committed by Richard C. Allen, a commodity pool operator and commodity trading advisor 
with whom the firm had a business relationship. See 855 F.2d 1288, 1289 (7th Cir. 1988).  
The court highlighted that the commission-sharing agreement and Stotler’s distribution of 
forms and literature through Allen supported a finding of agency. Id. at 1294.  Other factors 
indicative of an agency relationship included Allen’s exclusivity agreement with Stotler, 
Stotler’s assigning to Allen a salesman number, reference to Allen as a salesman in Stotler’s 
internal records, and Allen’s ability to place an order directly to the trading floor. Id. at 1290, 
1293–94.  As the totality of the circumstances suggested that Allen was Stotler’s agent, and 
the fraudulent activities occurred within the scope of the agency, the court held Stotler 
vicariously liable for Allen’s frauds under § 2(a)(1)(B). Id. at 1294–95. 
 202. See Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 75, at 41. 
 203. See id. at 46–48. 
 204. See id.; supra note 138. 
 205. See Reply Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 201, at 3–6 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).  For background 
information on Chevron doctrine, see supra Part I.C. 
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the Commission through numerous CFTC administrative proceedings.206  
Unlike litigating positions, interpretations established by the CFTC through 
its formal adjudicatory processes carry the force of law and warrant 
Chevron deference.207   
After addressing Step Zero, the CFTC attacked Chevron’s first prong, 
asserting, of course, that § 2(a)(1)(B) is ambiguous.208  The Commission 
explained that while the imposition of liability for the actions of “any 
official, agent, or other person acting for” makes clear that the provision is 
broader than common law agency, its reference to “other person acting for” 
has created an ambiguity because the statute offers no guidance on the 
identity of those undefined other persons.209  Importing a distinct meaning 
to each of the statute’s words, the CFTC argued, reveals the existence of a 
gap waiting to be filled by the CFTC.210 
Concluding its Chevron analysis, the Commission asserted that its long-
held construction of the provision was a reasonable one.211  Its 
interpretation that § 2(a)(1)(B) does not require control was reasonable, the 
CFTC maintained, because whereas the common law requires that an agent 
both act for the principal and be subject to its control, the CEA only 
contains the “acting for” requirement, without requiring control.212  
Likewise, the CFTC contended that its totality of the circumstances test was 
reasonable because only relevant circumstances are considered under the 
approach, courts use totality of the circumstances tests in a variety of 
situations, and a flexible standard is necessary to achieve the provision’s 
policy objectives.213 
2.  FxCM’s Brief 
Forex Capital Markets, the appellee, filed its brief on March 9, 2007.214  
FxCM devoted the first part of its argument to refuting the Commission’s 
position that the agency’s interpretation of the CEA’s vicarious liability 
 
 206. See Reply Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 201, at 4–5 (citing numerous cases); 
see, e.g., Knight v. First Commercial Grp., [1996–1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,942 (Jan. 14, 1997); Lobb v. J.T. McKerr & Co., [1987–1990 Transfer 
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,568 at 36,441 n.13 (Dec. 14, 1989); Reed v. Sage 
Grp., Inc., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,943 at 34,303 (Oct. 
14, 1987); Berisko v. Eastern Capital Corp., [1984–86 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 22,772 at 31,223 (Oct. 1, 1985); Bogard v. Abraham-Rietz & Co., [1984–86 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,273 at 29,391 (July 5, 1984). 
 207. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text (explaining that while Chevron 
applies to legal interpretations adopted by agencies in formal adjudications, courts do not 
apply Chevron to pure litigating positions). 
 208. See Reply Brief of Appellant CFTC, supra note 201, at 3–4. 
 209. See id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added)). 
 210. Id. at 4 (quoting United States v. Fuentes-Rivera, 323 F.3d 869, 872 (11th Cir. 
2003)). 
 211. See id. at 6–10. 
 212. See id. at 7 (citing cases).  The CFTC noted that the Ninth Circuit has explicitly 
recognized this requirement, and the Seventh Circuit has implicitly done so. See id. 
 213. See id. at 7–10. 
 214. See Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Forex Capital Markets, LLC at 49, CFTC 
v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-14270-CC). 
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position was time-tested and warranted the court’s deference in accordance 
with Chevron.215  Rather, FxCM argued, the district court correctly applied 
common law standards to its analysis of vicarious liability under Regulation 
1.2, § 2(a)(1)(B)’s twin;216 and under that standard, the district court did not 
clearly err in determining that Gibraltar was not FxCM’s agent.217 
In its response to the Commission’s abbreviated opening Chevron 
argument, FxCM alleged that the CFTC’s interpretation of the provision 
was a mere litigating position, and thus not entitled to the court’s 
deference.218  According to the firm, the CFTC had utterly failed to set 
forth a consistent interpretation of § 2(a)(1)(B) in the decades since the 
provision’s first enactment in 1921.219  FxCM pointed out that the CFTC 
offered “no relevant case law, or even legislative history, to support its 
theory.”220 
Before rebutting the remainder of the Commission’s argument, FxCM 
attacked the CFTC’s position in the district court as plainly conflicting with 
its position on appeal.221  FxCM noted that, in the Commission’s response 
to FxCM’s summary judgment motion, the CFTC actually advocated for the 
application of common law agency principles rather than a totality of the 
circumstances approach.222 
FxCM likewise contended that each of the cases relied on by the CFTC 
applied common law principles.223  Regarding Dohmen-Ramirez v. CFTC, 
which the CFTC cited to show that control is not required to establish 
agency under the CEA, FxCM claimed that the court applied an apparent 
authority theory rather than a broad totality of the circumstances test.224  
Control was unnecessary in that case, FxCM argued, solely because 
apparent authority requires that the purported principal “creates the 
appearance that the acts are authorized” and nothing else.225 
According to FxCM, Reed similarly did not support the agency’s 
position.226  The firm asserted that Reed, a reparations action decided long 
 
 215. See id. at 16–32.  It reserved the remainder of its brief to arguing that neither 
§ 2(a)(1)(B) nor Regulation 1.2 applied to the retail forex transactions in question. See id. at 
33-48.  As noted above, that argument has since been rendered moot by the amendment to 
Section 2 of the CEA in the CRA of 2008. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Forex Capital Markets, supra note 214, at 
16–27. 
 217. See id. at 27–32. 
 218. See id. at 18 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988));  
CFTC v. Zelener, 373 F.3d 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 219. See id. at 20 n.8 (citing cases). 
 220. Id. at 17. 
 221. See id. at 19. 
 222. Id. at 19 (stating that “the CFTC never suggested that the district court should apply 
any standard requiring less, or different, proof than was required under the common law” 
and arguing that the court should not consider the CFTC’s “‘broader’ vicarious liability 
standard for the first time on appeal”); see Plaintiff CFTC’s Response to Defendant Forex 
Capital Markets LLC’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 176, at 9–11. 
 223. Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Forex Capital Markets, supra note 214, at 20. 
 224. Id. at 21.  For a summary of the facts of Dohmen-Ramirez, see supra note 197. 
 225. Id. (quoting Dohmen-Ramirez, 837 F.2d 847, 858 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 226. Id. at 22. 
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before the CFTC gained partial jurisdiction over forex, only supports the 
position that those factors common to all futures commission merchant- 
introducing broker relationships do not themselves suffice to establish an 
agency relationship under the CEA.227  Additional indicia of an agency 
relationship must be present for a finding of agency—none of which were 
present here.228  In any case, FxCM contended, the Commission applied an 
apparent authority theory in Reed (even if it never said as much) because 
the introducing broker represented to his client that he was “part of” the 
futures commission merchant.229  No such claim was made in this case. 
FxCM claimed that, in addition to Dohmen-Ramirez and Reed, several 
other federal court opinions—as well as CFTC case law—supported its 
position that common law agency is the correct test for agency under the 
CEA.230  Rather than statutorily creating a broader scope of liability as the 
CFTC insists, the CEA’s vicarious liability provision merely codifies the 
common law rule.231  Congress, the firm noted, has also long understood § 
2(a)(1)(B) as “in essence provid[ing] respondeat superior and general 
principal-agent standards for imposing liability on employers and principals 
for the acts of their employ[ees] or agents.”232  What’s more, FxCM argued, 
the case law indicated that control is indeed essential to a finding of agency 
under the CEA.233  Under that standard, FxCM argued, the firm could not 
 
 227. Reed v. Sage Grp., [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
23,943 (Oct. 14, 1987). 
 228. Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Forex Capital Markets, supra note 214, at 22 
(citing Reed, [1987–1990 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 34,302–03). 
 229. Id. at 23. 
 230. Id. at 24–27; see, e.g., Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. CFTC, 794 F.2d 
573, 581 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that § 2(a)(1)(B) “‘provides respondeat superior and 
general principal-agent standards for imposing liability on employers and principals for the 
acts of their employees or agents’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 105 (1982), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3954)); Aspacher v. Kretz, No. 94 C 6741, 1997 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8000, at *12–22 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1997) (“As in common law, vicarious 
liability under § 2(a)(1)[(B)] may be based on agency theories of express, implied, and 
apparent authority.”); Pac. Trading Grp., Inc. v. Global Futures & Forex, Ltd., [2003–2004 
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 29,910 at 56,751 (Nov. 16, 2004) (“Section 
2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA is a codification of the common law principle of respondeat superior, 
and imposes strict liability on a principal provided that the agent’s misconduct was in 
furtherance of the agency.” (citing Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 
1986))). 
 231. Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee Forex Capital Markets, supra note 214, at 26 
(citing Pac. Trading Grp., [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 
56,751). 
 232. Id. at 24–25 n.11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-565, pt. 1, at 105 (1982), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3954). 
 233. Id. at 26–27; see Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 743 
(8th Cir. 2003) (noting that “in determining whether an agency relationship exists, the 
question hinge[s] on the principal’s right to exercise control over the activities of the agent” 
(citing Gunderson v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., No. 99-4032, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20971, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000))); Pac. Trading Grp., [2003–2004 Transfer Binder] 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 56,751 (“Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from 
the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf 
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958))). 
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be held liable as principal under the CEA for Gibraltar’s frauds because of 
the absence of control.234 
D.  The Eleventh Circuit’s Decision 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the court reviewed de novo the district 
court’s application of common law agency principles under the CEA’s 
vicarious liability provision.235  The court’s determination that FxCM was 
not liable for Gibraltar’s frauds, however, was considered a purely factual 
matter that the appeals court reviewed under the very deferential clearly 
erroneous standard.236 
Because the issue of whether vicarious liability under the CEA requires 
an element of control was a matter of first impression, the court began its 
analysis with a discussion of the relative case law from her sister circuit 
courts.237  The court acknowledged a circuit split with respect to the 
appropriate standard for the establishment of agency relationships under the 
provision, pointing out that some courts follow the totality of the 
circumstances approach, while others apply the test for common law 
agency.238  The court further noted that the majority of circuit court 
decisions, like the district court below, have actually employed language 
that conflates the two contrasting approaches.239 
The court noted that the majority of CFTC case law indicated the 
application of a totality of the circumstances test and that control is not 
required to establish agency under the CEA.240  While the court considered 
this authority somewhat “helpful” to its determination, it did not defer to the 
agency’s interpretation of § 2(a)(1)(B) because “there was [no] gap in 
which the agency needed to regulate.”241  Its own reading of the provision’s 
legislative history suggested the contrary; “that the vicarious liability statute 
and [identical] regulation codify common law principal agent liability.”242 
Holding that the CEA codified common law principal-agent liability, the 
court explained that “actual agency, either implied or express, requires:  (1) 
consent to the agency by both principal and agent; and (2) the control of the 
agent by the principal,” and concluded that this standard had been correctly 
applied by the district court.243  Because the facts adduced at trial failed to 
 
 234. Id. at 27–32.  For a brief overview of common law principal-agent liability, see 
supra note 118. 
 235. CFTC v. Gib. Monetary Corp., 575 F.3d 1180, 1186 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing United 
States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
 236. Id. (citing Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
 237. Id. at 1187. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 1188. 
 241. Id. at 1188–89 (discussing the legislative history of the CFTCA).  The court stated 
that the legislative “history indicates that Congress conceived of this language as a standard 
governing principals and agents, or a common law agency standard, and that Congress had 
not altered the conception despite the changes in commodities regulation.” Id. 
 242. Id. (noting that the CFTC’s vicarious liability rule, which the court below applied, is 
interpreted the same way as § 2(a)(1)(B)). 
 243. Id. at 1189 (citing RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958)). 
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indicate that FxCM exercised sufficient control over Gibraltar to establish 
an agency relationship, the appeals court upheld the district court’s findings 
as plausible in light of the record below.244 
III.  RIPPLE EFFECT OR EROSION?:  THE IMPACT OF THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT’S GIBRALTAR DECISION 
As detailed above, the Gibraltar court skirted lengthy Chevron analysis 
in holding that the CEA’s vicarious liability provision, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2(a)(1)(B), merely codifies common law principal-agent liability.245  In 
disregarding a long-held CFTC position, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the 
totality of the circumstances approach and became the first appeals court to 
read a control requirement into the CEA’s vicarious liability provision.246  
Although the decision has temporarily created a situation where forex 
dealers need no longer be “careful about whom they grasp to their bosoms 
as branch managers and commodity solicitors,”247 subsequent federal and 
administrative decisions as well as proposed CFTC regulations governing 
firms like Gibraltar suggest that the case’s impact will ultimately be 
nominal.248 
A.  Case Law and Chevron Doctrine Support Application of the 
Commission’s Totality of the Circumstances Test and the Absence of a 
Control Requirement 
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in Gibraltar, FxCM contended that the 
Commission’s totality of the circumstances test was a mere litigating 
position, not worthy of the court’s deference.249  The CFTC, of course, 
asserted that its interpretation of § 2(a)(1)(B) did qualify for Chevron 
deference because the provision is ambiguous, and its interpretation of the 
provision, expressed through two decades of formal adjudicative 
proceedings, is a permissive one.250  Despite the issue’s prevalence in the 
parties’ briefs, the appeals court disposed of Chevron with a half sentence 
buried in a lengthy paragraph about the long-standing statute’s legislative 
history.251 
Upon closer inspection, however, the CFTC’s contention—that the court 
ought to have deferred to its interpretation of the CEA’s vicarious liability 
provision—is persuasive.  As a preliminary matter, the CFTC’s position 
that control is not required to establish “agency” and that courts should 
assess agency under the CEA based on a totality of the circumstances is 
decidedly not a mere litigating position as FxCM contended.252  As 
 
 244. See id. at 1189–90. 
 245. See supra notes 235–44 and accompanying text.  
 246. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 248. See infra notes 288–94 and accompanying text. 
 249. See supra notes 215–20 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 203–13 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 196–97, 215–20 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrated by numerous administrative proceedings before the 
Commission since the mid-1980s—a number of which were upheld by U.S. 
courts of appeals253—the totality of the circumstances test has been firmly 
established as the test for determining agency relationships under the 
CEA’s vicarious liability provision.254 
FxCM’s contention that the case law on which the CFTC relied, 
including Dohmen-Ramirez and Reed, supported the proposition that 
common law agency rules apply,255 ignores the plain truth:  These cases—
and others—demonstrate that courts interpret the CEA’s vicarious liability 
provision “broadly and aggressively,” holding liable “futures industry 
participants who might not be liable under traditional agency principles.”256 
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit declined to defer to the CFTC’s 
interpretation of the provision because, after reviewing its legislative 
history, it determined that “there was [no] gap in which the agency needed 
to regulate,” i.e., the statute clearly and unambiguously provides for 
common law principal-agent liability.257 
The legislative history, however, is not as clear as the court suggested.  
When Congress first enacted the vicarious liability provision in the Grain 
Future Act of 1921, it was included under a heading titled “[p]rincipals 
responsible for acts of agents.”258  The legislation was enacted to combat 
fraud and manipulation in the commodities markets at a time of 
unprecedented volatility, in which a robust vicarious liability provision was 
necessary to provide the Commission with the ammunition needed to 
combat these market abuses.259 
Not until sixty years later, in connection with the addition of controlling 
person liability to the CEA’s statutory scheme, did Congress offer 
additional guidance on the provision, stating that it “in essence provides 
respondeat superior and general principal-agent standards for imposing 
liability on employers and principals for the acts of their employers or 
agents.”260  The spotty congressional record, which is essentially devoid of 
any reference to the provision until six decades after its enactment, is 
simply not enough to divine congressional intent.261  In any case, the 1982 
statement does not conflict with the Commission’s broader reading of the 
statute, in which respondeat superior-like strict liability is applied to other 
persons acting for another.262 
Giving meaning to each of the provision’s words further reveals its 
ambiguity.  Because § 2(a)(1)(B) imputes the acts and omissions of “any 
official, agent, or other person” acting in furtherance of the “agency” to 
 
 253. See supra notes 119, 141 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 223–29 and accompanying text. 
 256. Committee on Futures Regulation, supra note 119, at 242. 
 257. See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 104–17 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
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their putative principals,263 its plain meaning suggests that, under the CEA, 
principals are liable for the acts of both common law agents and others.  
Although the provision clearly extends that liability to other persons acting 
for the principal, the statute does not elaborate on their possible identities or 
provide a test to be used by the Commission in identifying them.264  This 
gap is waiting to be filled by the CEA’s sole administrator, the CFTC.265 
Had the district court applied the CFTC’s totality of the circumstances 
approach, however, it might still have reasonably concluded that the 
connection between Gibraltar and FxCM was in fact too tenuous to 
establish an agency relationship under the CEA.266  That said, the appeals 
court went astray in Gibraltar not only by glancing over the Chevron issue 
and not affording any deference to the CFTC’s long-held totality of the 
circumstances approach, but also by introducing a control requirement for 
determining principal-agent liability under the CEA.267 
B.  The Aftermath of the Gibraltar Decision 
While courts within the Eleventh Circuit are compelled to embrace the 
Gibraltar court’s introduction of a control requirement and the rejection of 
the CFTC’s totality test with respect to the CEA’s vicarious liability 
provision,268 those outside of the Circuit have explicitly dismissed it.269  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, for instance, 
recently rejected the Gibraltar court’s holding in In re Amaranth Natural 
Gas Commodities Litigation,270 in which a putative class of commodity 
futures and options holders sued a hedge fund and its associates for 
manipulating the price of natural gas futures in violation of the CEA.271  
Looking to the Second Circuit’s Guttman decision for guidance, the court 
deemed it unnecessary to “determine whether [one] exercised control over 
[another] . . . to find [an agency relationship] within the meaning of the 
 
 263. See supra notes 107, 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 264. See  supra notes 107, 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra Introduction. 
 267. See supra notes 143–44, 235–44 and accompanying text. 
 268. See CFTC v. Diamond, No. 8:09-cv-1811-T-17MAP, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
110537, at *19 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2009) (explaining that “[t]he common law test for 
agency supplies the standard for vicarious liability under the Act and accompanying 
regulations”). 
 269. See In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig.,  No. 07 Civ. 6377 (SAS), 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44571, at *14 & n.37 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010) (stating that the Gibraltar 
court “appl[ied] common law agency principles and require[d] plaintiffs to demonstrate 
control in order to find an agency relationship” under the CEA and declining to adopt that 
position).  But see Shroff v. Rosenthal Collins Grp., No. 08 C 929, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
75262, at *13–14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2009) (citing Gibraltar and applying the common law 
test). 
 270. No. 07 Civ. 6377 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44571, at *14 & n.37 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 30, 2010). 
 271. Amaranth, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44571, at *3. 
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CEA.  ‘[I]t is enough if [he] was “acting for” [her]’” within the scope of his 
employment.272 
The Commission has also remained steadfast in its approach, similarly 
rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s introduction of a control requirement into 
the CEA’s vicarious liability provision and continuing to apply its totality 
of the circumstances test in its administrative proceedings.273  In Jing Bian 
v. MG Financial, LLC,274 a reparations proceeding by an aggrieved investor 
against a registered futures commission merchant and its unregistered and 
unregulated introducing agent, an administrative law judge reaffirmed the 
Commission’s long-standing approach, finding the futures commission 
merchant vicariously liable for its introducing agent’s frauds under a set of 
facts quite similar to Gibraltar’s.275  Even though courts have not widely 
embraced the Gibraltar decision,276 the case has negative policy 
implications; it has greatly reduced the incentive for futures commission 
merchants and retail foreign exchange dealers (at least those in the Eleventh 
Circuit) to screen those individuals or companies that solicit business for 
them277 and enabled them to escape liability for frauds committed by their 
ill-intentioned “branch managers and commodity solicitors.”278 
As Judge Posner stated in the Seventh Circuit’s Rosenthal decision, “the 
ascription of agency is a purposive, policy-oriented act rather than an 
exercise in semantics.”279  The purpose of the CEA is to protect the 
investing public from fraud and manipulation in the commodities 
markets.280  A robust vicarious liability rule is necessary to protect 
unsophisticated investors like Mrs. McDonald, “to ensure that futures 
commission merchants bear responsibility for the wrongdoing by their 
agents and employees,”281 and to incentivize futures commission merchants 
to “be more careful about whom they grasp to their bosoms as branch 
managers and commodity solicitors.”282  Gibraltar was owned and operated 
 
 272. Id. at *25 (quoting Guttman v. CFTC, 197 F.3d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 273. See Jing Bian v. MG Fin., LLC, No. 08-R17, 2009 CFTC LEXIS 76, at *26 n.6 (Oct. 
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 274. No. 08-R17, 2009 CFTC LEXIS 76 (Oct. 28, 2009). 
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 276. See supra notes 268–73 and accompanying text. 
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 278. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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principals are more likely to investigate the character and ability of agents before they are 
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by a couple of known swindlers whose disciplinary history and checkered 
past was publicly available to anyone over the Internet.283  A simple 
investigation by FxCM into Kline and Fremer’s backgrounds would have 
most likely nipped Gibraltar’s frauds in the bud, preventing the tragic losses 
incurred by Mrs. McDonald and its other investors.284     
This problem is especially acute in situations like Gibraltar, because in 
the off-exchange forex business, soliciting brokers are not required to 
register with the CFTC as introducing brokers.285  Such brokers have not 
been required to meet capital requirements or obtain a guarantee of their 
obligations from their futures commission merchant or retail foreign 
exchange dealer.286 
The Commission is currently seeking to close this gap through new 
rulemaking,287 having proposed a swath of rules to overhaul its regulation 
of the off-exchange retail forex markets.288  The proposed regulations 
mandate that all brokers soliciting business for a retail foreign exchange 
dealer or a futures commission merchant dealing in forex, like Gibraltar, 
register with the CFTC as introducing brokers.289  The new rules would 
require these forex introducing brokers to solicit business for only one retail 
foreign exchange dealer or futures commission merchant, like FxCM, with 
whom they must have a guarantee agreement.290  Were these restrictions in 
place when Kline and Fremer were developing their scheme, the frauds 
committed against Mrs. McDonald and others likely never would have 
occurred.291 
CONCLUSION 
Because the case law and Chevron doctrine so directs, federal courts 
addressing the issue ought to follow the Second, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits in paying deference to the CFTC’s interpretation of § 2(a)(1)(B) 
and applying its flexible totality of the circumstances test without requiring 
control.292  That said, in light of recent federal and CFTC administrative 
decisions rejecting the Gibraltar court’s conclusion and the forthcoming 
CFTC rules governing retail foreign exchange, it appears that the case’s 
negative implications will be only negligible, “and this will be . . . all to the 
good.”293 
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